Month: August 2018

To say the least, Jeff Sessions is an unlikely champion of our constitutional liberties, but the fact is that his sense of professional ethics is about the only thing that is preventing us from becoming an illiberal democracy.  It isn’t just Mueller, although that matters a lot.  It is the complete politicization of the DOJ which is at stake here.

Some GOP senators are apparently telling Trump that it is OK to replace Sessions after the election.  If that happens, you can be sure that Trump will be looking for someone who will turn the DOJ into a body designed to protect his legal interests and lock up his opponents.  There is no reason to believe that a Senate controlled by the GOP will do anything to prohibit that; after all, if you accept the logic of an argument by a pro-GOP commentator in today’s NYT, an independent DOJ is just a “norm,” not a constitutional requirement, and “norms” are designed to evolve over time.

The bottom line is that it is really, really, really important for the Democrats to do everything possible to win control of the Senate in November, even though the odds are stacked against them.  If they don’t, all hell is going to break loose.

The EU is up the creek without a paddle.  Under attack by both Putin and Trump, it apparently is unable to solve the problems of immigration and slow growth.  The UK is leaving; Italy could be next.  Illiberal democracy is a growing threat, and more euro crises are very likely in the future.  What should be done?

The EU has been a success as a sort of souped-up free trade area.   The leadership should accept that and focus on what it does best–permit the free movement of people, goods, and services.  Give up on the notion of “ever closer union” unless and until the people of Europe start to see themselves as Europeans first, and citizens of their own countries second.  Stop defending the euro at all costs, stop the bailouts, and let the Italians go if they insist.

Other than the nonsensical “rigged witch hunt,” Trump’s favorite catchphrase is “no collusion” (sometimes misspelled).  As we know, “collusion” is a legally undefined term, and is not by itself a crime, although it sounds a lot like “conspiracy,” which is.  What does Trump mean by “collusion,” and is he guilty of it?

As far as I can tell, Trump’s definition of “collusion” has three elements:

1.  The Russians took illegal actions for the purpose of getting him elected;
2.  He knowingly cooperated with them; and
3.  He offered, and subsequently acted, to provide the Russians with foreign policy concessions in exchange for their assistance with the election, or possibly for financial help with his businesses.

In short, the essence of Trumpian “collusion” is a quid pro quo.

What does the evidence that is currently available to the public show?

1.  There is no doubt that the first standard was met.  Even most Republicans admit it.
2.  #2 is a bit murkier.  There is, of course, tape of him calling on the Russians to assist with Hillary’s e-mails, but he insists that he was joking.  There was the famous meeting at Trump Tower, but we do not know for certain that he was aware of it.  Various campaign operatives had contacts with Russians, and some of them lied about it, but we don’t know what, if any, direct communication they had with Trump.  Mueller may have evidence on this point of which we are not aware.
3.  There is plenty of evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as efforts to provide a quid pro quo.  Trump employed people in his inner circle with Russian connections; his son-in-law tried to create a secure back channel to the Russian government to discuss policy even before he took office; he has done everything he can to put off imposing sanctions on the Russians; he continues to damage our relationships with our European allies; and finally, he has repeatedly praised Putin and put the Russian system on the same moral plane as our own.  In short, he is doing exactly what you would expect a paid Russian agent to do, and with considerable success.

The problem is that these actions can also be explained by his very unusual ideology and personality.  So what exactly is motivating him?  We will probably never know, in spite of Mueller’s best efforts, because even if the system had the ability to ask him directly, nothing he said, under oath or otherwise, could be taken seriously, given his propensity for telling lies.

If there is one thing upon which Trump’s defenders and I agree, it is that Mueller should release his report as soon as possible, because:

1.  The American people deserve to know its contents prior to the election; and
2.  Realistically, Trump can’t fire Mueller between now and November, because he knows it would damage the GOP’s chances of winning the election (and endanger the Kavanaugh nomination, as well).  Once the election is over, however, he will have no such reservations.  If the GOP hangs on to both houses, he will view it as vindication, and act accordingly;  even if it doesn’t, he may well figure that his base will protect him from being removed from office, no matter what.  If so, he’s probably right.

Fast forward to 2024.  Bannon, Trump, and Putin have succeeded in destroying the unity of Europe and breaking the alliance with the US.  The EU and NATO only exist on paper.

Germany is, by far, the largest economy in Europe.  It is no longer protected or restrained by the rest of the continent.  What will the Germans do?  Will they build nuclear weapons to deal with the potential threat from Russia?  Will they make an issue of the border with Poland?  Will militarism resurface out of necessity?

The last hundred years of history suggest that the answer to all of those questions is yes.  The lesson for Bannon, Trump, and Putin is to be careful what they ask for, because they might get it.

Historically, progress towards an “ever closer union” has been driven by an alliance between the French and the Germans.  Over the last fifteen years, however, Germany has grown much faster than France, and the German government proved itself much better at getting things done.  As a result, the center of power in the EU moved decisively towards Berlin.

The Great Recession, the bailouts, and the various euro crises put the Germans in a position to dictate terms to the rest of the EU.  They consequently attempted to Teutonize the EU by imposing austerity on its debtors.  Austerity resulted in widespread resentment, not a speedy recovery.  In addition, the German attempt to share the burden of illegal immigration among all of the EU states was an admirable failure, and led to political problems at home.

The German effort to remake the EU through its economic and political clout was largely inadvertent, was never popular, and is over.  Today, the leadership of the EU comes from . . . no one.  Dreams of an “ever closer union” have been put on hold, and the EU is just trying to survive.  How will it evolve?  More on that later in the week.

A few thoughts about yesterday in the judicial system:

1.  While the Manafort case has no direct connection with Trump, Mueller needed a win to convince the handful of undecideds that the investigation isn’t just a “rigged witch hunt.”  He got it.
2.  The really appalling thing about the Manafort conviction is Trump’s reaction;  instead of distancing himself from the man, he continues to say, essentially, that a little fraud among friends isn’t worthy of prosecution.  Given his history, that’s exactly what you would expect.  As far as he’s concerned, anyone–the government included–who permits himself to be duped by a liar gets what he deserves.
3.  Cohen’s statements about the hush money in open court clearly make him criminally responsible for a campaign finance violation.  He won’t be removed from office for that, however.  His base is glad he paid the hush money;  without it, Clinton would be president today, women, gays, and illegal immigrants would be in charge, and the country would be going to hell in a handbasket.
4.  There can be no serious dispute that the hush money was paid at Trump’s direction.  No one would do that without the client’s knowledge and approval.  Trump’s only legal defense, in the final analysis, will be that he did it, not to win the election, but to save his marriage.  His previous denials won’t help him persuade anyone with that defense.
5.  Unfortunately, Trump now has a greater incentive to stay in office after yesterday, because he knows he’s looking at a potential jail sentence the minute he leaves office.
6. Get ready for lots of chants of “Jail to the Chief!” and “Lock him up!” for the rest of his term.

I DID NOT AUTHORIZE PAYING HUSH MONEY TO THE PORN STAR!  But what if I did?  Everybody does it!

Following up on yesterday’s post, how exactly do Republicans who believe in both capitalism and revealed religion reconcile the two?  For the CDs and the Reactionaries, the answer is quite different.

For a CD, capitalism is embraced, not as an end in itself, but as a mechanism that creates wealth, which can then be redistributed by the government in the interests of a just society.  The CD believes in a robust welfare state; a regulated capitalist economy is the device that makes it possible.

Religious Reactionaries, on the other hand, tend to believe that worldly prosperity is a sign of righteousness and God’s favor.  For them, therefore, there is no conflict between capitalism and religion; the poor and unfortunate get what they deserve, and there is no reason for the government to bail them out.

An Italian statesman famously noted after reunification that, having created Italy, one now had to create Italians.  The same is more or less true of the EU and its relationship to its citizens.  If “ever closer union” is to become more than a pipe dream, the people of Europe need to think of themselves primarily as “Europeans.”

But what exactly binds these very different people together?  After all, they have been fighting wars among themselves for centuries.  Here is the list, with my comments:

1.  In, say, 1950, the first part of the answer would clearly have been Christianity.  Today, not so much, due to the increasing secularization of Europe, and the influx of Muslim immigrants.
2.  A commitment to liberal democracy?  Have you been to Hungary lately?
3.  A common culture and history?  Not really, although the nearly universal use of English as a second language helps to some extent.  With Brexit looming, there’s an amusing paradox for you.

What you are left with is Eurovision, the Ryder Cup, and football (soccer).  That isn’t much to use as a basis for creating an identity.

Maybe Trump can help them out by being so obnoxious that they can’t help but unite against him.  Laugh if you want–it’s not impossible.

You can divide the history of the EU into two phases.  The first phase, the EEC, was essentially just a free trade agreement involving a minority of the countries within Europe.  It had two very clear objectives:  (a) to promote the reconstruction of European economies after the disaster of World War II in order to fend off communism; and (b) to provide a solution to the problem of the overmighty German state.  It was an unqualified success.

Phase two, the EU phase, has been more of a mixed bag.  In this phase, pan-European institutions were both deepened (to involve more common governmental functions), and widened (to encompass far more countries).  The objectives of this were less clear, but included:  (a) to create a soft power counterweight to the US and Russia; (b) to promote additional economic growth through the free movement of people, goods, and services; (c) to promote liberal democratic values; and (d) to provide a mechanism for the resolution of disputes among its members, and thus to avoid future damaging wars.

This phase has been marked by some very notable failures.  The euro brought some economic benefits, but, on the whole, has done more harm than good.   Immigration is a festering sore that continues to threaten to tear the EU apart.  Liberal democracy is a thing of the past in several of the central European countries.  “Ever closer union” is no longer viewed as a desirable end in and of itself by much of the population.

Where is the EU likely to go from here?  I will be discussing that topic throughout the week.

Now, here’s a steel cage match for you.

In the blue corner, we have . . . capitalism!  The creator of unparalleled economic growth, it promises perpetual change, and boasts about creative destruction.  It brings both wealth and endless insecurity.  Value is established, not by some fixed measure of inherent worth, but by how much a willing purchaser is prepared to pay in a free market.  It generates new winners and losers every day.

In the red corner, we have . . . revealed religion!  Here, God has provided the truth to the world, and it is immutable.  If changing facts get in the way of the story, you are required to believe the story, not your eyes.

It sounds like a classic battle between the irresistible force and the immovable object, doesn’t it?

And the winner is . . . capitalism, at least for those of us who don’t accept revealed religion as a source of truth.  For conservative members of the GOP who embrace both, trying to balance them must be an intellectual nightmare.

Here’s a thought experiment for you:  imagine two starkly different hypotheticals for the 2020 campaign.  In #1, Kamala Harris is the Democratic nominee, and she is running under the banner of “White Men Suck.”  Her plan is to create a coalition of minorities and white women to sweep away the white patriarchy.  In #2, Bernie Sanders is the nominee, and his slogan is “Vive la Revolution.”  His approach is to bring white and minority working class people together to overthrow Wall Street and the other bastions of capitalism and create the socialist Jerusalem.

On paper, these coalitions could represent a majority of American voters.  How do they work in practice?

Both of them lose, bigly.  Harris loses because minority turnout is predictably low, and white women, sickened by her constant complaints about “white privilege,”  hold their noses and break for Trump.  Sanders loses because a large majority of white working class men simply refuse to stand by their minority comrades and sing Kumbaya.

The point here is that the Democratic Party can’t afford to be just a class-or an identity-based party.  It has to be both, and something more, to win on a national level.

We reconvene to discuss foreign policy.

C:  OK, we’re back, and I’m going to ask some questions about foreign policy.

O:  Shoot.

C:  Let’s start with a country that has been in the news a bit lately–Russia.

O:  I’ve heard something about that.

C:  I did a post about what Putin wants.  What do you think he wants?

O:  Three things.  First and foremost, to stay in power.  Second, to dominate his near abroad, and to recreate the Russian Empire to the maximum extent possible.  Third, respect for Russia as a world power, and an equal partner of the US.

C:  With that in mind, why do you think the “reset” failed?

O:  You need to keep in mind that we didn’t really have great expectations for the reset–we just wanted to get his cooperation on a few things that mattered.  And it did work, to some extent;  it would have been impossible to get the Iran sanctions without his help.

That said, I think it was mostly Ukraine and the Arab Spring that made things go south.  Rightly or wrongly, and I would say mostly wrongly, he blamed us for bringing more instability into the world, just as we had with Iraq and the color revolutions.  Ukraine in particular hit too close to home.  He thought he had to do something, and he did.

C:  Do you think you were forceful enough in your response to Crimea and Ukraine?

O:  In retrospect, yes.  He knew, and we knew, and everyone knew, the United States wasn’t going to war with Russia to save Ukraine.  He wanted it more than we did.  We made him pay a big price without escalating to the point of making everything much worse.  I have no regrets about that.

C:  What about Libya?

O:  I do have regrets about Libya.  There were some good reasons to get involved there, but I shouldn’t have let myself get talked into it without asking more questions.  I had too much faith in our allies’ ability and willingness to fix military and political problems without our involvement.  I don’t know that I would have done anything differently, but I certainly would have asked more questions before we acted.

C:  Do you have anything to say about Benghazi?

O:  Hillary responded to all of that very clearly.  I don’t have anything to add to what she said.

C:  Are the Libyan people, and the world as a whole, better off today without Qaddafi?

O:  It’s appalling to have to say this, but I would have to say no.  Sometimes revolutions just make everything worse.

C:  How do you think that story ends?

O:  The story never really ends.  I honestly don’t know.

C:  Let’s talk about China.  I suspect most people would say the “pivot to Asia” was too little, too late.  Would you agree?

O:  Yes and no.  We didn’t get to it until late in my administration due to other pressing problems.  But the keystone to it was the TPP, which was more of a geopolitical thing than a free trade agreement.  It would have worked to both restrain China and encourage the Chinese government to behave more responsibly.  Unfortunately, Trump has torn it up.  The other parties have implemented it without us, and still want us to join.  Maybe we will when Trump is gone.

C:  Do you think you were forceful enough in your response to the fill islands?

O:  The fill islands aren’t as big a deal as they are made out to be.  They’re sitting ducks in wartime.  We made our point by not recognizing Chinese sovereignty over them, but they weren’t important enough to risk war.

C:  Is dealing with China the great foreign policy conundrum of the 21st century?

O:   Without a doubt, yes.

C:  In the long run, can a horrible war be avoided?

O:  If the issue is handled properly, yes. The best way is to create a rules-based system that has the support of the Chinese.  Will that happen?  I don’t know.

C:  Let’s move to the Middle East.

O:  It had to happen sooner or later.

C:  How would you grade yourself on Iraq and IS?

O:  It was a mixed bag.  I reject the criticism that we should have kept troops in Iraq, and that we could have somehow used our troops as leverage against the bad decisions and corruption of the Maliki government.  We wanted to stay in Iraq, but the government would only permit us to remain under terms that would have been completely unacceptable to anyone, Trump included, so we made a virtue of necessity and left.  And anyone who thinks that the mere presence of a few thousand American troops would have forced Maliki to be nicer to the Sunnis and less corrupt doesn’t know anything about him.

I think the criticism that we didn’t recognize the IS threat early enough is valid.  That said, we put together an approach to win the war, and it worked.  I’m proud of that.

C:  On a related note, I suspect a lot of people would say that you never really appreciated the fear that Americans had of IS.  You kept telling us that deaths from furniture exceeded deaths from terrorism.  Do you have any regrets about that?

O:  Some.  The message I was trying to send was that in countries like Israel and the UK that are accustomed to dealing with terrorism, the people just get on with it.  You have to do what you can to get rid of it, but there are so many things you can’t control, so just treat it as a very small part of your life and move on.  Americans weren’t ready for that message.  I guess I didn’t find the right way to say it.  I do regret that.

C:  I have argued that your mistake in Syria was in setting the red line, not in refusing to enforce it.  Do you agree?

O:  Basically, yes.  To the extent that I gave any real thought to the red line, I figured that Assad would just respect it, and I would never have to act.  That was a mistake.  But rejecting the advice of the blob and refusing to launch some sort of pinprick attack was one of the best things I did.  Has Trump enhanced American credibility with his pinprick attacks?  I don’t think so.

C:  I suspect you view the now defunct Iran deal as one of your great accomplishments.  Do you agree?

O:  Absolutely.  First of all, it was really hard work getting everyone, including the Russians and Chinese, to support the sanctions.  Then we had to reach an agreement that would work for everyone.  We did.  Trump and Israel are enjoying the benefits of it, even though they won’t acknowledge that.

C:  It appeared to the world that you were tilting away from our traditional support of Saudi Arabia towards a more transactional relationship with both Iran and the Saudis.  Do you agree?

O:  America’s support of Saudi Arabia has always been based on interests, not shared values.  Once the Saudis stopped being the swing oil producer, we had more freedom to be transactional.  That was a good thing, particularly since the current Saudi government has become increasingly aggressive in its foreign policy.  I had no desire to make America the tip of the Saudi spear.  They resented that.

I know there is a lot of hostility, based on history, between Iran and the US.  In the long run, I would hope the two countries would get over it and move on.  The nuclear deal wasn’t premised on that, but it accommodated it.

C:  We’ll conclude with a few questions about Trump.  Some people have argued that there is a basic continuity between your foreign policy and his.  Do you agree with that?

O:  God, no.  In the long run, I believe the best protection for America is not just its economy and armed forces, but a fair rules-based international system.  The trick is to get the other major powers to buy into that.  I think we were making progress with that with the TPP, but Trump blew it up.  His bottom line is that he only believes in power, not rules.  That’s fine as long as you’re the uncontested world leader.  If you ever reach the point when you’re not, there will be no one out there to help you.

C:  Both you and Trump were willing to ignore the advice of the blob and talk to unfriendly world leaders.  Would you say that is a basic similarity?

O:  Yes and no.  I’m not in any way critical of his willingness to talk to Kim, or even to the Iranian leadership.  I do have a problem with his lack of preparation and his belief that he’s so smart and charming, he can make difficult problems go away.  Diplomacy doesn’t work that way.

C:  Do you think we’re headed for war with either North Korea or Iran?

O:  With North Korea, no.  Trump’s heart doesn’t seem to be in it.  With Iran, yes.  MBS and Netanyahu are determined to push us into war, and economic sanctions aren’t going to force the regime to change its behavior, so where else can he go?

C:  Thank you for your time.

 

Some things are really complicated, but this isn’t:

People who misuse their overriding social, legal, and/or economic power to abuse others–boys, girls, animals, whatever–are scum.

People who cover up those actions and thus enable future crimes are complicit in them.

That’s it.  It’s not about gay priests, or clerical celibacy, or anything like that;  it’s about power, and the abuse of it.

If you’re unfortunate enough to live in an area in which a favored group of people has too much clout of one kind or another to be questioned, this sort of thing is going to happen.  It is only when society morphs into something different and more open–in this case and in Ireland, it became more secular–that justice of a kind becomes possible.  And so, paradoxically, the loss of prestige on the part of the Catholic establishment may be a positive development both for the health of the Church itself and the society around it in the long run.