It’s complicated.
A few years ago, I suggested that the best way to evaluate presidents on foreign policy was to use a graph with active and passive as one axis and interests and values as the other. Kissinger would have been at the top of the active/interests quadrant.
He clearly identified with Metternich, which made sense; after all, both of them were in charge of foreign policy in the country that had most to lose if they failed. Metternich’s career ended when he was driven out of power by a revolution in 1848, however. That should suggest to you that there are limits to anyone’s ability to keep the lid on.
In a lot of ways, Kissinger reminds me of Netanyahu, who believes in conflict management rather than solutions and thinks Israeli values and interests are ultimately the same. After all, if Israel doesn’t do what it has to do to survive in an overwhelmingly hostile environment, there are no Israeli values. Kissinger probably would have said the same thing about American liberal democracy during the Cold War; you had to make deals with dirty people and kill a lot of innocents to keep the beacon of democracy safe from Soviet imperialism, which was the ultimate value.
A lot of people really hated Henry. If you lived in Chile or Cambodia, you probably had reason. I don’t, so I had mixed feelings about him.
The bottom line, in my opinion, is that foreign policy realism, to be complete and effective, has to include an understanding of America’s messianic streak. Ideology and national character cannot be completely divorced from realism, and circumstances evolve with time. If you don’t understand that, you look like a 21st century King Lear, screaming about change and trying fruitlessly to bomb it out of existence.
Or, to put it another way, values do exist independently of interests, and they have to be considered and accommodated as part of the geopolitical equation.