On the Xi Doctrine

Historically, the Chinese Empire was able to dominate its neighbors, due to its superior size, strength, and level of civilization.   Adjoining countries which had accommodated at least some aspects of Chinese culture were treated (generally benignly) as vassal states; other nations were viewed purely as barbarians.

Western nations did not fit in this paradigm; hence, the Empire’s conceptual and practical difficulty in dealing with them.

While the ultimate scope of the international ambitions of the current Chinese state is not clear, it is reasonable to assume, based on its actions in the last few years, that its aspirations in the near abroad are consistent with China’s traditional behavior towards its neighbors.  Call it the Xi Doctrine.

On Chinese Contradictions

The success of the Chinese government over the foreseeable future will depend largely on its ability to resolve, or at least paper over, the following contradictions:

  1.  The ideal:  Marxism, a Western ideology with universal values.  The reality:  Chinese exceptionalism.
  2.   The ideal:  Marxism, a dynamic, forward-looking ideology.  The reality:  A culture that attaches great value to harmony and stability.
  3.  The ideal:  A decentralized, consumer-driven economy.  The reality:  Very extensive government intervention in the economy to promote stability and maintain a monopoly on power.
  4.  The ideal:  An economy that promotes innovation.  The reality:  Minimal respect for property rights for parties without government connections and severe limits on the free flow of information.
  5.   The ideal:  Encourage investment through a predictable system of taxation and commercial law.  The reality:   Government retains arbitrary powers; capital flees the country.
  6.  The ideal:  Eliminate endemic corruption.  The reality:  A one-party system, a politicized judicial system, and no freedom of the press.
  7. The ideal:  Accommodate Hong Kong and Taiwan by tolerating different systems.  The reality:  Intolerance of democratic ideas in Hong Kong hardly encourages the notion of an improvement of relations with Taiwan.

 

 

On Chinese Culture

Today is National Day in China.  In light of that, and the fact that the rise of China is likely to be the biggest geopolitical challenge we will face in the first half of the 21st Century, today will be the first of several posts on the workings of the Chinese system and what it means for the rest of the world.

Visiting China for three weeks a few years ago and reading some books obviously doesn’t make me an expert on such a complex subject, but the following observations are just common sense:

  1. China is a very vibrant and colorful country.   People who grew up during the Mao years and became accustomed to seeing pictures of hordes of indistinguishable people wearing the same clothes frequently have the wrong impression.  The Chinese are nearly as gregarious as the Italians, have the same pride in their culture as the French, and are as pragmatic as Americans.
  2. The Chinese are extremely proud of their accomplishments as a civilization.  Why wouldn’t they be?  The record speaks for itself.
  3. The Chinese don’t love their government–they tolerate it as long as it works.   National pride revolves primarily around their culture, not their government.
  4. The Chinese people don’t claim any right to rule themselves on a day-to-day basis, but have no reluctance to complain when things go wrong.  Given the strength of the apparatus of repression, you have to be brave to take your complaints public, but they do when necessary.
  5. China is a very resilient nation.  World War II, the Civil War and its aftermath, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution–the list of disasters just in the last 80 years goes on and on, but the people are optimistic about the future, and they don’t dwell on the past.  The reasons for this will be the subject of a future posting.

On the Best Way to Fight a Three-Party War

Don’t be the one in the middle.

It was always clear that Putin was escalating in Syria to protect Russian strategic interests there and to impress the Russian people with his virility.  Based on today’s news reports, it would also appear that he may have a larger aim–to force the US and its allies to back Assad by wiping out the non-ISIS opposition.

If what we are seeing today becomes a pattern, it may well be necessary for us to get international support for a no-fly zone over at least some portions of Syria that are held by parties other than the government and ISIS.  That would force the Russians to choose to actually fight ISIS (which would be a plus), to risk a confrontation with superior US-backed forces, or to withdraw.

A Trump Day Limerick on The Donald’s Tax Cut Plan

There once was a Donald named Trump.

His poll numbers were in a slump.

He offered a tax cut

To placate the rich, but

It won’t get him over the hump.

Having spent the last few months playing the populist and flipping the bird at the PBPs, Trump has apparently decided to reunite the Reagan Coalition by proposing a plan that differs from the Bush plan only in its details.  Will the WSJ gods be appeased?  I think not.

On 2012 and 2016: How They Differ

At the beginning of the 2012 campaign, I predicted the GOP race would turn into a battle between Romney and not Romney, and that not Romney had slightly more votes, but would only prevail if the votes went to a single person.  My prediction essentially turned out to be correct.  The not Romney vote was split between Gingrich and Santorum, and Romney won.

Based on his record, Rick Perry was the strongest Reagan Coalition candidate in the race in 2012, and he should have won the nomination.  In retrospect, Romney’s gambit of attacking him from the right on immigration was the masterstroke that divided the Reagan Coalition and ultimately resulted in Romney’s victory.

While the characters in the 2016 race may seem eerily familar (suggested title for the revived musical–“The GOP At Sea”), the dynamics are different, for the following reasons:

  1.  Jeb! clearly believed that he, like Romney, would be the undisputed master of the CD and PBP factions when he decided to enter the race.  Rubio’s decision to run, and early success, means that he will have to fight for those votes, probably for the entire duration of the campaign.  That in turn improves the chances of the winner of the Reagan Coalition subprimary and increases the likelihood that the party will go into the convention without a clear leader.
  2. The faithful are even angrier than they were in 2012, which makes the nomination of an outsider more plausible.
  3. Trump drew the correct conclusions from Romney’s success on immigration, and has flourished as a result.  He has more staying power than his 2012 partner in outrageousness, Michele Bachmann, and has exposed the party’s fault lines at every turn.  Since he is self-financed, he will likely be a factor, even with diminished numbers, until the end of the race.

I can guess the finalists at this point, but not the winner.  This is going to be fascinating.

 

On 2016: Reviving 2012

It occurred to me over the weekend that, to a large extent, the characters in the 2016 GOP race are reprising roles created by different candidates in 2012.  Consider the following:

2012                        2016

Uncharismatic governor        Tim Pawlenty             Scott Walker

Underperforming governor   Rick Perry                   Jeb Bush

African-American                     Herman Cain             Ben Carson

Libertarian                                 Ron Paul                     Rand Paul

Mouth that Roared                   Michele Bachmann   Donald Trump

Social Conservative                  Rick Santorum            Mike Huckabee

Congressional Bombthrower   Newt Gingrich           Ted Cruz

While many of the roles are similar, the script appears to be significantly different.  That will be discussed in a post tomorrow.

On Chris Christie, the Bipartisan Bully

Christie’s pitch to the GOP electorate consists of two nearly, but not quite, mutually exclusive concepts:

  1. I have governed successfully in a blue state by making deals with Democrats.
  2. I kick liberal butt.

This was always going to be a very difficult tightrope to walk, even under the best of circumstances.  Then the evidence started pouring in that perhaps New Jersey was not as well-governed as he suggests, and Trump has outswaggered him at every turn.  As a result, his campaign is on life support.

I have to admit, the thought of him engaging in chest-bumping with Vladimir Putin has some appeal, but it isn’t going to happen.

On Ben Carson’s Importance to the GOP

Carson isn’t going to be the nominee–he has way too little experience to run a successful nationwide campaign.  He is extremely important to the GOP faithful, however, because, in their eyes, his presence in the race proves two things:

  1.  The GOP is not a racist party.
  2.  Their success in life was due solely to their own hard work, not to any advantages provided by birth.   Yes, maybe some people start a bit behind, but if they’re not lazy and shiftless, they can make it, too.  Look at Ben Carson–he did it! So don’t ask me for money for free stuff for the poor;  what they need is tough love, not a government hammock.

On Rubio, Cuba, and “Blazing Saddles”

Our efforts to isolate Cuba over the last fifty-odd years have had the following impacts:

  1.  We have provided a built-in excuse to the Castros for their economic failures;
  2.  We have actually isolated ourselves, rather than the Cubans, diplomatically in  Latin America; and
  3.  Our citizens have been deprived of valuable business and cultural opportunities.

There is no evidence with which I am familiar that suggests that these negatives were offset by human rights improvements on the island.  As a result, then, it is fair to say that the policy has been fully tested over a long period of time, and is a complete failure.

President Obama clearly views things this way, and wants to normalize relations as quickly as possible.  The hope obviously is that diplomatic and economic engagement will ultimately bring improvements to the system in Cuba, but whether it does or not, the immediate objective is to eliminate the down sides to the current policy that are identified above.

Marco Rubio’s objection to normalization is that we are not getting enough human rights concessions in return.  In other words, he apparently believes we should continue to shoot ourselves in the foot until the Castros pay us to stop.  As a negotiating tactic, this reminds me of the scene with the newly-appointed sheriff and the white lynch mob in “Blazing Saddles,” with the exception that the Castros aren’t nearly as dumb as the mob.