On Australia and the GND

From rampant, dangerous wildfires to the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef, climate change is already having a significant impact on Australia. And yet, a government that promotes the mining and sale of coal just pulled an upset and won the election.

Don’t you think there is a message in there for you, GND fans?

How Liberal Democracy Dies

In the end, the most significant differences between a liberal democracy and a banana republic are these:

  1. The executive in a liberal democracy follows court orders. The executive in a banana republic either stacks the judiciary or ignores it;
  2. The press is controlled by the executive, either through legal or financial means, in a banana republic; and
  3. Enemies of the executive are prosecuted for frivolous, partisan reasons in a banana republic.

To my pleasant surprise, the Trump administration has chosen to complain bitterly about adverse court orders, but not to ignore them–yet. It is clearly stonewalling legitimate efforts at congressional oversight, however, and we have plenty of evidence, particularly recently, that Trump is eager to prosecute his opponents, even with the assistance of foreign governments. We also remember his threats about controlling the media, and note Justice Thomas’ statements in support of that agenda.

The key figure in this process is William Barr. Based on his behavior and his reputation as an avatar for increased executive power, there is no chance that he will stand up against his boss in public for the essential norms of a liberal democracy. He will either: (a) slow walk Trump’s demands for political investigations; (b) openly express enthusiastic support for them, while doing nothing to effectuate them; or (c) actually embrace them and thus begin the process of destroying the republic.

At this point, do you really have any faith in him? Me, neither.

On the Yglesias Test

Matthew Yglesias thinks left-wing commentators spend too much time thinking and talking about the policy initiatives that have been proposed by the various Democratic candidates. With the filibuster and the Roberts Court in place, they have no realistic future. The key questions for the electorate, according to Yglesias, actually revolve around foreign policy and bureaucratic appointments, because those are the areas in which a Democratic president would have the most authority and discretion.

That is the voice of a true realo, and every word of it makes sense. If you accept it, the most appropriate nominee would be Biden, who has the most foreign policy experience and the biggest network of qualified potential appointees. If you prefer a more revolutionary approach, then the best choice would be Warren, who knows the bureaucracy inside and out, even if her ideas about foreign policy are unformed at best. For some reason, however, Yglesias undercuts his own message by maintaining that the Democrats need a fresh new spokesperson, not a retread. There is undoubtedly a case for that on electability, but not on qualifications.

The Revolution at Three Percent

Desperate times call for desperate measures. That’s the reason dramatic increases in the size of the federal government have been associated with crises–the Great Depression, World War II, and the 2008 Great Recession.

There are no guarantees that the current conditions will remain in place in November, 2020. Absent a fundamental change, however, the Democratic nominee will be facing an election in which real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are both around three percent.

It is imaginable, given Trump’s poor poll numbers, that a nominee who promises to bring decency and competence back to the White House, along with some incremental changes favoring working people over the wealthy, can win even in the face of the three percents. Is it plausible, however, that a Sanders or a Warren “revolution” can succeed without some sort of a cataclysm between now and November, 2020?

No.

On 1979 and 2019

One of my few vivid memories of the yearbook from my senior year in college is of a photo of a handmade sign saying “Nuke Iran Until It Glows in the Dark.” The sign did, in fact, accurately depict the intensity of feeling in the country in 1979.

Trump and Bolton will be relying on those memories to build bipartisan support for the upcoming war. Will it work? I don’t think so. Forty years is a long time; images of Carter and the hostage crisis will take a back seat to perceptions about Trump’s divisiveness and the Iraq War in the eyes of most Americans. In the absence of a truly compelling Iranian provocation, the blue team isn’t going to accept the legitimacy of the war, and there is going to be big trouble at home.

Why America Fears China

Imagine a scenario in which the UK is light years ahead of the United States in AI research. Would that alarm you? Would it keep you up at night? Of course not. But if you substitute China for the UK, the story is completely different. Why?

In all honesty, a little bit of it is probably racism. A much bigger part, however, is concern about the nature of the Chinese regime. We look at the Uighur camps, the black jails, the controls on the internet, the growth of the surveillance state, the abductions of critics of the regime, the construction on the fill islands in the South China Sea, and the use of economic ties for leverage against weaker countries and think, that would be us if China dominated the world. True, the Chinese wouldn’t insist that we live on collective farms, but this alternative doesn’t sound too promising, either.

If you pose this to a Chinese official, he will probably tell you that China is still a poor country that has no interest in dominating the world, and would undoubtedly fail if it tried. The problem is that the increases in the military budget and the aggressive rhetoric from the government tell a different story. How can we be sure that China’s ambitions are limited to economic growth and sovereignty over its borders? We can’t, really, so we have to prepare for the worst.

The answer to this, obviously, is for the Chinese government to dial down the nationalism and make a bigger effort to present itself as a friendly, peaceful neighbor. Will that happen? I doubt it; Xi is too invested in nationalism and repression to back down.

On Israel, Iran, and Plan B

Israel doesn’t really want an American war with Iran, says the NYT. It’s only about applying maximum pressure to bring about regime change.

Right. And when that doesn’t work, what do you suppose Bibi’s Plan B is? Is it to thank Trump for the effort and just leave it alone?

Would Bernie Be So Bad?

The usually sensible Matthew Yglesias argues that Bernie would not be a disaster as the Democratic nominee or as president, because: he typically runs ahead of the nominee in Vermont; he was a largely pragmatic and successful mayor of Burlington; he can’t get the “revolution” through the system even if he wins the election; and he would have to rely on Obama holdovers to staff his administration. Is Yglesias right?

As far as he goes, yes, but he ignores the negative impacts of Bernie’s foreign policy, which is the other side of a Trumpian coin. Sanders promises to preach for left-wing values abroad without actually doing anything serious to restrain our adversaries or promote our interests. In practice, that probably means campaigning openly for Corbyn in the UK, acquiescing to Maduro in Venezuela, complaining about elected nationalist thugs in the EU and South America without taking any concrete action to dispose of them, and giving Xi and Putin the freedom to dominate their respective spheres of influence. That, my friends, would just be a disaster of a different sort; he would alienate our remaining friends and accomplish nothing.

Also, to make an obvious point, Vermont is hardly representative of America as a whole. It is closer to Switzerland than Oklahoma. Using Bernie’s performance there as a guide to anything is a clear mistake.

Steely Don Backs Down

Could it be that he’s figured out that it isn’t a good idea to engage in absurd trade wars with your friends when you’re looking at a serious trade war with China and a possible shooting war with Iran? A first grader would have reached that conclusion months ago.

On Marx and Aristotle

Like Marx, but two thousand years before him, Aristotle saw politics largely as the clash of interests among social classes that were largely defined by the distribution of wealth. Unlike Marx, Aristotle didn’t believe in dialectical materialism; he saw class struggle as a perpetual issue, and he advocated good government that would minimize it.

Whose vision of politics was more accurate? Dialectical materialism, for reasons that I have pointed out in previous posts, is an absurdity. The answer is Aristotle, by a mile.

Why Iran Isn’t Korea

Donald Trump is doing his best to persuade the world he doesn’t want to go to war with Iran. If you take him at his word, which is almost always a mistake, he is just waiting for the ayatollahs to call him to make a deal. One assumes his optimism on this score is based on his experience with North Korea.

Is North Korea a good analogy for Iran? No, because:

  1. War with North Korea would be unimaginably costly for both sides. Iran doesn’t have that kind of weaponry; the worst it can do is drive up the cost of oil to the point of causing considerable pain throughout the world.
  2. North Korea’s neighbors are desperate to avoid war. Saudi Arabia and Israel desperately want to drag us into one, because they will benefit from it far more than we ever could.
  3. Trump kind of enjoys Kim’s outrageousness. The dour ayatollahs, not so much. For their part, the ayatollahs don’t have the kind of negotiating flexibility that Kim does, if they ever wanted to use it, which doesn’t seem likely.

On Aristotle and the Framers

Aristotle didn’t reject the Greek gods, exactly; he could see some social and political utility in maintaining public cults, so he never spoke against them. His view of the universe, however, didn’t have room for them, and he pretty clearly didn’t believe in them. He relied on logic and experience, both individual and collective, as his sources of authority. Since Greek city-states had tried a variety of different political systems, he analyzed them and laid out his opinions for what worked best under what circumstances. He never assumed that the purpose of politics was to serve God and not man, or that the political system of the day was divinely inspired and thus unchangeable.

Notwithstanding the rubbish you frequently read in right-wing history books, the most prominent Founding Fathers were Deists, not Christians. They believed in a creator God who left men pretty much to their own devices. Their views on politics were based on their opinions of human nature, which largely revolved around concepts of class and material self-interest, not on revealed religion. Finally, they relied on the historical record regarding republics, including the Greek and Roman experiences, in the process of drafting the Constitution.

And so, when you read that James Madison ordered as many books as possible regarding the rise and fall of European republics to assist him in putting his ideas together, you are seeing evidence of Aristotle’s DNA in the American system.

How NATO Could Die

Our erstwhile European allies are skeptical of the evidence that the Iranians or their proxies are directly involved in attacks on oil tankers. Why wouldn’t they be? Here’s the record:

  1. We all know what happened with the evidence of WMD in Iraq;
  2. Trump’s National Security Advisor has openly promoted war with Iran;
  3. Trump has openly disregarded the wishes of the Europeans on the Paris Agreement and the Iran deal; and
  4. Trump repeatedly threatens to impose ridiculous tariffs on the Europeans on specious national security grounds.

When we go to war with Iran, we’re not going to have any support from NATO; the only countries cheering us on (from the sidelines, of course) will be Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It isn’t hard to imagine Trump going into a rage over that, complaining bitterly that we spend billions on NATO and get nothing in return, and deciding to pull out.

Putin will be thrilled, as usual.

On Warren and China

I was reading excerpts from an NPR interview a few weeks ago in which Elizabeth Warren was making very Trumpian complaints about Chinese trade policies. The interviewer reminded her that Obama had worked for the TPP in an effort to create a rules-based system that would be an alliance against Chinese militarism and mercantilism in embryo. Warren responded by saying she thought the TPP would be an ineffective mechanism to restrain predatory Chinese behavior. She had nothing to propose as an alternative.

That, my friends, is a serious problem. For all of her reputation as an intellect, Warren has not made any meaningful effort to think this issue through. She has a visceral reaction to Chinese human rights violations and mercantilist trade policy, a willingness to work with allies to compel change, and nothing more.

When you get right down to the essence of it, there are only a few ways to respond to the rise of China. You can acquiesce to it, and turn the world into spheres of influence. You can try to crush it unilaterally through tariffs and military force. You can join them, by using the same kind of mercantilist levers–primarily subsidies, tariffs, handouts to friendly countries, and discriminatory regulations. Finally, you can go completely the other way and double down on what has worked in the past: an open political, economic, and legal system with relatively low taxes and regulations; and the fair enforcement of a rules-based international system with the assistance of our friends. That was Obama’s approach.

Donald Trump apparently believes (at least on some days) that he can bring about regime change in China through the use of tariffs. He can’t. What does Warren believe? We won’t know until she actually goes to the trouble of putting her oversized brain to the problem first.

On Greece and Chinese Money

The Chinese have invested hundreds of billions of euros in Greece, most notably in the port at Piraeus. The implicit quid pro quo is the Greek government’s willingness to block EU resolutions on Chinese human rights. The EU and the US are unhappy about this state of affairs, but there have been no meaningful repercussions to date.

I see two significant lessons in this:

  1. It illustrates the fundamental differences between the challenges presented by the Soviet Union and China. The former was principally an ideological and military adversary; the consequences of surrendering to it were understood to be a military occupation and a massive change to the occupied country’s socio-economic system. China, on the other hand, is willing to invest large sums of money, and only asks for silence on issues that don’t directly affect the country in question in return. You can easily understand why the Greeks (and others) would see this as a good deal, particularly in an age of EU-imposed austerity.
  2. “America First” is no way to compete with this kind of challenge. You can’t beat something with nothing but complaints and threats.