From an economic perspective, the British government ran the American colonies as, wouldn’t you know it, colonies, the most obvious example being the Navigation Acts. The second-rate status of the colonists was, in the end, the principal cause of the American Revolution. After the new nation had been established, it made sense to protect industry for two reasons: first, to provide a viable source of revenue for the government; and second, to shield infant businesses from competition that had historically been unfair. The latter is the classic case in which even economists who prize efficiency above all can support some measure of protection.
But once established, the tariff long outstayed its welcome. By the 1830s, it was the source of great sectional friction, and the nation’s first secession crisis, although everyone knew that it was largely a proxy for the greater issue of slavery. The tariff question revolved around money and numbers, so it could be compromised; slavery was a moral issue which could not. Still, protection continued to be a source of friction between agricultural and industrial interests.
By the 1880s and 1890s, the tariff was once again front and center in American politics. Northern manufacturers insisted that it permitted them to pay higher wages to their workers but did not behave that way in practice. The public noticed. The GOP largely lost the election of 1892 over the tariff, and only prevailed in 1896 because the 1893 depression and the currency issue took precedence in the minds of most of the voters.
Tariffs started to take on different meanings in the 20th and 21st centuries. For a discussion of that topic, see my next post.