On Biden’s Afghan Dilemma

As I’ve noted on several occasions, there are two models for America’s involvement in Afghanistan. In the Korean model, we keep troops in the country indefinitely in order to maintain what amounts to a stalemate; in the Vietnam model, we cut the best face-saving deal we can, withdraw, and hope for the best, while fully expecting the worst.

Trump clearly preferred the Vietnam model in Afghanistan. Left to his own devices, Biden appears to agree with him. Should he follow Trump and adhere to his agreement with the Taliban? Here are the relevant questions:

  1. Is the Afghan government likely to survive an American withdrawal, regardless of the terms of any power sharing agreement with the Taliban?
  2. What are the costs of maintaining a small number of troops in Afghanistan?
  3. Are the Afghan government’s chances of surviving likely to improve over time if we stay for a few more years, and then leave?
  4. Does the strategic importance of Afghanistan justify keeping troops there and not, say, in Yemen or Somalia?

The clear answers to these questions are no, not much, no, and probably not. They cut both ways in the argument.

This is a difficult call. If you’re Biden, you don’t exactly relish the thought of being the guy in power when the rebels take control of Kabul. The results are likely to be horrific, and you can’t count on the GOP accepting that this is the inevitable outcome of an agreement reached by Trump. After acquiescing in Trump’s position on withdrawal, you know they’re going to beat you up as “the man who lost Afghanistan.”

In my opinion, the least worst option is to insist on virtually flawless compliance by the Taliban with the Trump agreement, and to use any reasonable pretext to keep our troops in place to maintain the stalemate. It’s hardly a perfect solution, but none is available.