Afghanistan is often analogized to Vietnam, and with good reason. The analogy isn’t perfect; the American public is more indifferent than hostile to the war, since Afghanistan was the platform for an attack on us, we haven’t suffered major losses there, and it didn’t result in the reinstitution of the draft. However, the objective in both countries was to create enough space to permit a successful transition from American to local control of the war. In Vietnam, it failed completely; in Afghanistan, after 17 years, it has become clear that it will never succeed.
The questions, then, are as follows:
- What is a realistic objective for the war?
- Is the war worth the effort?
- Are there viable alternatives to the longstanding pattern of surging and retreating?
My analysis is as follows:
- The only real American strategic interest in Afghanistan is in preventing the country from becoming a platform for terrorist attacks in the US and Europe. Promoting liberal democratic values and limiting the cultivation of opium there are certainly worthy goals, but we are probably doomed to failure in the end, given the local culture and economy.
- Afghanistan is not unique when it comes to providing a platform for terrorists. There is no longer any obvious reason to throw a disproportionate number of resources at it as opposed to, say, Yemen or parts of Africa.
- The alternatives to the current surge and retreat approach are: (a) escalate the war to include parts of Pakistan; (b) treat Afghanistan in the same way as Yemen or Africa (i.e., withdraw virtually all of our combat forces and fight terrorists, with or without the cooperation of the government, with drones and special forces); or (c) use South Korea as the model, rather than Vietnam, and accept openly that we will be there to maintain a stalemate indefinitely.
- Since Pakistan has nuclear weapons, (a) is not a viable approach. There is no obvious reason why (b) can’t work as long as our objective is as limited as I have suggested in #1. (C) has worked in South Korea, and can work in Afghanistan as long as the American public is willing to accept the costs of propping up the government and maintaining a stalemate. (C) is also the best alternative if you believe that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban is a reasonable possibility.
- Either (b) or (c) would be more realistic, and have a better chance of success, than the current approach. I prefer (b) because I don’t believe there is a sufficient justification for treating Afghanistan differently than the other terrorist hot spots, and the record doesn’t show much of a basis for believing that the Taliban and their Pakistani friends are much interested in a deal.