Cromwell

It occurred to me this morning that the task for Harris is very similar to the one presented to Rishi Sunak; she has to run both as an incumbent and an agent of change. Sunak never had a chance, but Harris does. Why?

First of all, America’s economy is in much better shape than the UK’s. Second, America is more polarized than the UK, and has fewer swing voters, so there is a higher floor for an incumbent. Third, Harris, as a fairly powerless VP, is less tied in the eyes of the public to the current government than Sunak was. Finally, Sunak had to run against Keir Starmer, not Trump. That makes all the difference in the world.

Assume that Gore had succeeded in flipping about 500 votes in Florida and had won the election. How would America and the world have been different today?

The 9/11 attack certainly would have been attempted. While some commentators have been extremely critical of the Bush administration’s intelligence work, I think you have to assume the terrorists would have been successful. Gore would undoubtedly have attacked Afghanistan in the same manner that Bush did. There is no compelling reason to believe the course of that war would have changed. The big difference, however, is that Gore probably would have ignored the calls for war against Iraq from the right. As a result, Saddam would have remained in power.

Would Iraq with Saddam have been a better place than it is today? If you’re a Shiite living there or an official in the Iranian government, the answer is clearly no. For the rest of the world, the answer is yes. Saddam was a brute, and was difficult to manage, but he helped keep Iran and Sunni fundamentalists in check. There would be no Shiite militias attacking American bases in Iraq, and ISIS would never have raised its ugly head. Iran would have fewer resources to send to its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. There would be more oil on the world markets. Life, on the whole, would be better.

And what of American politics? Without the war in Iraq, there would have been no rationale for an Obama campaign in 2008. Either Hillary Clinton or McCain would have been Gore’s successor. Try imagining how that would have turned out.

I was a true independent until 2004; I voted for both Republicans and Democrats in presidential elections until that date. With only one exception, I don’t regret those votes, including the one for Dole in 1996. The exception is my vote for Bush in 2000. If I and a few hundred other Floridians had known what was coming, history might have been very different.

It has always perplexed me at a certain level that Gore lost in 2000. America was at peace; America’s standing in the world had never been stronger; and the economy was roaring. How could Gore turn that into a losing hand? The answer, I think, has two parts: Gore’s personality put people off; and the stakes in the election didn’t appear to be very high. There were no storm clouds on the horizon, until, of course, there were.

How does 2024 stack up against 2000? There are two important similarities: the election is likely to be extremely close, and, regardless of what the GOP candidates say, the country is enjoying both peace and prosperity. The big differences are plain for everyone to see: liberal democracy is under threat; and Trump, unlike Gore, will refuse to concede if he loses and unsuccessfully exhausts his legal remedies. Nobody will vote thinking that nothing is at stake this time.

In what ways would the world be different if Gore had prevailed? For that intriguing counterfactual, see my next post.

Alvin Bragg has punted the issue of the timing of the sentencing to Justice Merchan. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Merchan decides that nothing in the immunity decision compels him to order a new trial, should he sentence Trump before the election?

Yes. Regardless of what the sentence is–and I don’t expect it to include jail time–the American people are entitled to know it before the election. It will be, and should be, a factor in the national decision-making process.

Trump will denounce it as “election interference.” I would call it a welcome blast of truth and openness in the system.

Based on the national experience during the George W. Bush administration, a column in today’s NYT tells us that the price of meat will skyrocket as a result of the immigrant raids planned by Trump and Vance. Rural communities in which a meatpacking plant is the biggest employer will be crushed. Then what?

Vance and Oren Cass will tell us not to worry; the condition is just temporary. The industry will either pay much higher wages to attract real American workers, or the companies will innovate their way out of the problem. Unfortunately for them, with unemployment at four percent, there is no large pool of workers who will be both available and eager to take such unpleasant work. As for the innovation solution, that may come in time, but there are no guarantees, and what happens in the short run? Misery for both producers and consumers, and lots of it.

And how will Trump deal with the explosion of dissatisfaction that results from his policies? Will he change course, or will he just rely on the Insurrection Act?

Let’s hope we never find out.

In keeping with his image as an ass-kicker who radiates strength, Trump filled his administration with generals the first time around. It didn’t end well; all of them left on bad terms with him and are among his most vocal critics today. Why?

Because Trump views the military as a group of half-crazed professional hit men responsible only to the commander-in-chief. Notions such as patriotism, dignity, honor, respect for law, and self-sacrifice which actually permeate military culture are totally alien to him.

If Trump is elected in November, this conflict is going to become extremely important, because the continuing existence of our liberal democratic system is going to depend on the unwillingness of the military to follow orders that violate American law. With that cheery thought, happy Labor Day!

Plenty of foreign leaders have a vested interest in the outcome of the American election. Which ones are most likely to take action on behalf of Trump?

Let’s start by dismissing three possible contenders. The Chinese leadership is having trouble deciding whether the long-term diplomatic gain from a Trump victory is worth the short-term economic pain and uncertainty. Iran has no incentive to see Trump elected. And MBS, who has the power to sway the vote by jacking up gas prices, has clearly made his peace with Biden. Don’t expect any action on that front.

That leaves Putin and Netanyahu. For Putin, a Trump victory is the gift that keeps on giving; it would almost certainly mean the imposition of a favorable peace in Ukraine, and it could well result in the end of NATO, an objective he could not possibly accomplish on his own. A fall breakthrough in Ukraine would discredit Biden and Harris and help win the election for Trump. Can he do it?

Probably not. Disinformation probably won’t win the election this time around, either. He could drive up the price of gas by withholding Russian oil from the market, but he can’t afford to do that during wartime. The most plausible tactic would be a cyberattack, but that would invite retaliation and would consequently be very risky. On the whole, therefore, a Russian action that would be decisive in the election is fairly unlikely.

The other open Trump ally is Bibi. Trump would give him a blank check in Gaza and Lebanon and might even agree to attack Iran on his behalf. On the other hand, Trump is unreliable, and eliminating criticism from America would give the Israeli far right the ability to dictate the course of the government. Bibi would no longer be able to argue that he is the only man capable of navigating the tightrope between the extremists and the rest of the world. Does he really want to give that up?

Bibi also has to deal with the Israeli military, whose opinions are closer to Biden’s than to his, and the political implications of a wider war on the election are far from clear. On balance, I think he will keep his hands to himself and hope for the best, as he defines it.

Trump’s supporters like to argue that he created more stability in the world with his unpredictability. As the story goes, the bad guys are terrified of the madman with nuclear weapons, so they stay on the straight and narrow. The good guy with the gun beats the bad guy with the gun, because he projects strength, which is all that matters in international affairs.

In reality, we have seen Trump’s foreign policy act before, and it is much more predictable and feeble than he likes to pretend. Here are its core principles:

1. Trump, unlike his predecessors, likes to talk about nuclear war, but none of it is credible. He really isn’t a warmonger. His weapon of preference is economic sanctions, most of which don’t work.
2. Trump prefers dealing with strongmen, who remind him of himself, over democratic leaders.
3. Trump can be manipulated through flattery. He also demands to be the center of attention at all times.
4. Trump is a neo-mercantilist who is motivated primarily by money and wants to make deals, particularly if there is something in it for his company.
5. Trump doesn’t believe in a community of values or universal human rights. To him, America’s allies are just moochers who take advantage of us by hiding under our nuclear umbrella. They should be made to pay for the privilege.
6. Trump believes in playing good cop, bad cop and keeps his options open until the last minute. Even his agreements can be torn up on a moment’s notice.
7. Trump is a classic bully. Stand up to him and he’ll fold. Fortunately for him, he is good at spinning his failures as successes, so he typically doesn’t have to follow through with his threats in order to maintain his credibility, at least in his own eyes.
8. Trump believes in instinct and personal relationships rather than preparation and understanding of the issues.

In short, while TR walked softly and carried a big stick, Trump talks stickly and carries a big soft.

I declined to make any predictions about the outcome of the presidential election in the early part of the year, which turned out to be wise; a lot of extraordinary things have happened since then, and the predictions I did make haven’t aged well. At this point, however, I am prepared to say that Harris will eke out a narrow victory if the following three things happen between now and November:

1. The Fed lowers interest rates;
2. Harris outperforms Trump during the debate; and
3. There are no foreign policy crises that cause undecided voters to think the world would be better with Trump as president.

The condition that concerns me the most is #3, because there are external actors who have a stake in a GOP victory. I will identify them and discuss their motives and possible courses of action in a subsequent post.

Harris, due to the unusual circumstances behind her nomination, is running both as a largely successful but unpopular incumbent and an agent of change. The respectful but firm questions from Dana Bash were intended to bring out the tension between the two postures. Harris bridged the gap mostly with platitudes and evasions.

It wasn’t very intellectually satisfying, but it was effective. Changing the subject and answering the question you prefer to hear is a trait of all successful politicians. Trump does it all of the time.

The interview didn’t hurt Harris at all, and it was good preparation for the debate. She can expect similar questions from the moderators on September 10.

If there is one thing the far right and left agree on, it is the need for a “revolution” in America. Bernie Sanders has been calling for one for years; Kevin Roberts explicitly promised one on behalf of Heritage Foundation and warned the left not to get in the way; and Trump’s agenda has always included one, although he doesn’t use that term. Of course, the right and the left have different objectives: Sanders wants wealth redistribution and a much larger welfare state; Roberts and the New Right want the Godly Society; and Trump wants to be an absolute monarch, accountable to no one but himself. Does the American public really want any of these results?

Regardless of what the answers to the pollsters’ questions suggest, they haven’t voted for anything like “revolutionary” change since 2008. 2024 is unlikely to be any different; the new president is going to win by a small margin, and the majority in both the House and the Senate will be microscopic. Does that sound revolutionary to you?

STRONG

America loves that I’m strong.

Like the man said, I’m badder than Kong.

‘Cause I’m right even when I am wrong.

If you doubt it, then you don’t belong.

____________

Now the Democrats always are weak.

Think the future belongs to the meek.

But this man is not turning his cheek.

If I lose, then you’re all up the creek.

___________

I’m strong.

Yes, I’m strong.

No blue team member could write this song.

I’m strong.

Yes, I’m strong.

If you doubt it, then you don’t belong.

No member of the Republican Party has less right to complain about the withdrawal from Afghanistan than Donald Trump; after all, he was the one who negotiated the withdrawal agreement with which Biden ultimately chose to comply. Nevertheless, he is making it a campaign issue and insisting that Harris bears a share of the blame. Is that reasonable?

No. The record makes it quite clear that the withdrawal was Biden’s project more or less alone. For better or worse, he believed passionately that it was time to get out, because there was no reason to think that conditions in Afghanistan would ever improve. He did it knowing that the outcome could be messy, which it obviously was.

That said, has the parade of horribles that we were told would occur after the botched withdrawal come to pass? I would say no, just as it didn’t after Vietnam. American economic and military power are objective facts that cannot be wished away by our country’s critics and enemies even after we make mistakes.

The fake interview continues, with a focus on foreign policy.

C: I want to start by asking you a conceptual question. I know that you, like most people, see China as America’s most dangerous potential adversary. Is your concern about China based on foreign policy realism or a Huntingtonian position on a culture clash?

V: I don’t think it makes a difference in this case. China is the biggest threat, period.

C: Let me phrase the question in a different way. Assume that the UK became America’s biggest rival in the world. Would you have the same level of concern that you do now?

V: Of course not.

C: And your position is not based on the nature of the Chinese regime. You, like Trump, have made it clear that the Chinese can have as authoritarian government as they like; it’s what the government does externally that matters.

V: True.

C: That makes you a Huntingtonian. What is it about Chinese culture that strikes you as being so scary and alien? Remember, Xi believes in traditional values just as much as you do. He supports men over women, has no patience for LGBTQ people, thinks the Chinese need to have more children, and supports efforts for economic self-sufficiency. That’s you, in a nutshell.

V: The Chinese aren’t Christians. They believe in astrology, ancestor worship, and lots of weird crap. That makes them scary.

C: Ramaswamy thinks we should give Putin what he wants in order to make him an ally against the Chinese. Do you find that plausible?

V: Not really. Putin is a killer and an imperialist who can’t be trusted to keep his word. He’s not really a cultural ally of America.

C: If your opinion of him is so harsh, why do you oppose aid to Ukraine?

V: I don’t have any illusions about the nature of the Russian regime. It’s a question of allocating resources. We can’t stop both Putin and Xi. The Europeans should deal with Putin. Anyway, Putin can’t afford to take all of Ukraine, so I don’t see him going any farther than he already has.

C: The Poles and Lithuanians don’t agree.

V: They’re wrong.

C: Is it fair to say that you think China should be contained?

V: Yes.

C: That can’t be done without the support of our allies. And yet, you and Trump are supporting measures–most notably, universal tariffs–that will piss them off and invite retaliation. If Chinese containment is such a priority, why would you do that?

V: Our so-called allies have nowhere to go. We won’t protect them against Chinese or Russian aggression if they don’t fall into line. That includes choosing not to retaliate against our tariffs.

C: So you accept Trump’s view that our alliances are really a protection racket?

V: I prefer to call it a fair quid pro quo.

C: What if our friends tell you and Trump to pound sand and move towards China and Russia?

V: That’s a risk I’m willing to take. America is the indispensable nation for both economic and military purposes. If you want to chart your own path without American subsidies, that’s your business. You’ll have to pay for your own security, and you won’t have access to American markets.

C: Would you scrap Biden’s security agreement with Australia and the UK?

V: That’s up to Trump.

C: Will a Trump-Vance government defend Taiwan?

V: If the Taiwanese provide adequate compensation, yes.

C: What about countries that prefer not to take sides, such as India?

V: You’re either with us or against us. India will have to choose.

C: And if they pick China, which is realistically possible? What happens to the containment plan?

V: They have a border with China that isn’t secure. When push comes to shove, they will pick us over the Chinese, even if they’re paying tariffs.

C: What about the rest of the Third World? The Chinese are working hard with both money and diplomacy to gain allies there.

V: For the most part, those countries are more trouble than they’re worth. If American investors want to put money there, fine. We’re not going to push it.

C: Will a Trump-Vance government go to war with Mexico over drugs? Trump talks about it all the time.

V: The Mexicans will give us whatever we want when push comes to shove. We have the leverage. They have to do what we say. There won’t be a war.

C: Don’t you think that a trade war with Mexico would have American victims, as well?

V: We’ll compensate them with the tariff proceeds. The Mexicans don’t have the money to do that. They can’t win a trade war with Uncle Sam.

C: Thank you for your time.

Trump and Vance are attacking Tim Walz from every possible angle. Vance is arguing that Walz misstated his National Guard record and resigned to avoid service in Iraq. Trump, for his part, insists that it matters that Walz was just an assistant coach. Will these attacks make a difference?

No, because the point of talking about Walz’ coaching career and military service is not to prove that he was Vince Lombardi or Sgt. York. Walz is on the ticket because he is a character who shares lots of traits with average people in the Midwest. He is, to use the fashionable term, “relatable.” The Trump-Vance attacks do not touch that.