Cromwell

We passed the 10% mark of Trump’s term a little less than two weeks ago (I know, it seems like an eternity).  Given that, it seems appropriate to review the questions I raised about his administration before he took office, and to see where we stand today:

1.  Which economic scenario is occurring?  I indicated that there were three possibilities:  “Funhouse Reagan” (huge tax cuts with minimal spending cuts); “Reverse Robin Hood” (the same tax cuts with big cuts to anti-poverty programs); and “Trade Warrior” (one of the first two with trade wars).  My prediction was “Funhouse Reagan.”

Thus far, the tax cuts have not become reality, although they are certainly in the works.  The Trump budget fell strongly on the side of “Reverse Robin Hood,” but few people in Congress take it seriously.  Conflicts on trade to date have just been talk.  The most likely outcome is still “Funhouse Reagan.”

2.  Would we have an unconventional foreign policy, or just a blustery traditional one?  On style, the former; on substance, more the latter.  Trump has gone out of his way to offend our allies and to relinquish world leadership to the Chinese.  He also undercuts our diplomatic efforts virtually at every turn.  He hasn’t sold Europe to the Russians or embraced Assad in Syria, however.

3.  How much damage would he do to the Constitution?  Thus far, the judiciary and the political checks and balances in the system have held their own.  It’s early days, however;  call me after we have a legitimate crisis.

This week will be devoted to a discussion of terrorism.  Since the term is a pejorative one, and reasonable people disagree as to its meaning, the discussion has to start with a definition:

The extra-legal use of physical force at a level intended to cause death or severe bodily harm on unsuspecting people for political purposes.

There are a number of issues that inevitably rise when one attempts a definition:

1.  Can a government engage in terrorism?  Absolutely.  If the use of force takes place outside of the operation of law, it can be terrorism.

2.  Is it fair to call it terrorism if there is no peaceful, legitimate alternative?  Yes.  As I use the term, it is a tactic, not an insult.  There was plenty of terrorism in the American Revolution.

3.  Can attacks on security forces ever be considered terrorism?  Yes, if they have no reason to expect the acts will occur.  Acts of violence during what both sides acknowledge is a guerrilla war are not terrorism under my definition.

The key issue for Obamacare’s regulation of the individual market was pre-existing conditions.  The solution has often been described as a “three-legged stool.” Here’s how it works:

1. The insurance companies, in a completely free market, either refuse to accept customers with serious pre-existing conditions, or charge them vastly higher rates.  In order to make insurance available and affordable for these people, resources have to be shifted to them from healthy people.  Theoretically, that could be done through taxes or assessments on existing insurance policies, but a more obvious model existed in the form of group policies with community rating.  That was the option included in Obamacare.
2.  Community rating increases risks for the insurance companies and prices for healthy people.  As a result, young, healthy people get a bad deal from it, and have less economic incentive to purchase insurance, which, if unchecked, could send prices into a death spiral.  The legislative response to this was the individual mandate.  The idea was that, yes, young and healthy people may be getting hosed in the short run, but 20 years from now, someone else will be paying higher prices to support them.  In a sense, the system was built on faith in the future, like Social Security and Medicare.
3.  The individual mandate means that people who can’t otherwise afford it are compelled to purchase insurance.  This issue is resolved by subsidies tied to income and the local price structure.

So how do the House and Senate bills address the three-legged stool?

1.  Intellectually, Republican politicians reject community rating, because they think bad health is primarily a result of poor lifestyle choices.  That said, they cannot ignore the fact that even some of their middle-class and wealthy constituents have pre-existing conditions and would be ruined without affordable insurance, so they have been unable to eliminate community rating entirely.  The House bill waters it down by providing for optional state waivers and by permitting insurance companies to impose higher prices, relative to Obamacare, on older people.  Since the state waiver provision was unpopular, the Senate bill dropped it, but kept the higher prices for old people.
2.  The individual mandate is eliminated in both bills.  In a lame attempt to avoid the death spiral, the House bill permits insurance companies to impose much higher prices on people who don’t meet a continuous coverage standard.  The current version of the Senate bill does not address the death spiral at all, and is intellectually vulnerable on that ground, but there are strong indications that the bill will be amended this week to permit insurance companies to refuse to cover people with lapsed coverage for six months.  Both of these approaches will make the current “job lock” problem much worse.
3.  The House bill makes a major ideological statement by typing subsidies solely to age–not to ability to pay.  As a result, poor people lost, and relatively wealthy people won. The Senate bill, on the other hand, is just a much stingier version of Obamacare;  it continues to tie the levels of subsidy to income and geographic areas.

The Senate bill keeps more of the current Obamacare framework in place than the House bill.  You could call it “Obamacare Lite,” but I prefer to refer to it as Obamacare’s illegitimate child, because it isn’t intended to solve any of the issues with the existing legislation–it is just an attempt to save money for tax cuts for the rich.

What does all of this mean for the individual market?  We don’t know what, if anything, will ultimately pass, but the most likely outcome is that most Americans relying on the individual market will have a choice between buying more expensive insurance with much higher deductibles and co-pays than they have currently, or deciding not to buy it at all.  In other words, under Obamacare, you were legally required to buy a meaningful insurance plan;  with the GOP approach, you will have a choice between “insurance” and relying on prayer and the emergency room.

For Trump, language is a weapon;  he uses it to deceive, to intimidate, to make himself the center of attention, and to keep people guessing.  He doesn’t use it to tell the truth, because for him, truth is an illusion;  it is power that matters in all of his relationships.

The tapes episode is a perfect example of this.  For the record, I never believed for a minute that any tapes existed.  Nor do I believe a word he says until he puts his money where his mouth is.

The sad fact is that we, as Americans, are just going to have to get used to this, and adjust accordingly.

 

Krugman asks himself in today’s NYT why the GOP would move a health care bill that will do so much damage to many of its supporters, and concludes that many Republicans think their supporters are so wedded to the red tribe that losing their health insurance won’t be enough to change their votes.

Bingo.  They’re probably right, too, barring a change of course from the Democrats on cultural issues.

I noted this morning that someone was doing a search to determine what faction can claim Marco Rubio as its own.  It’s a good question, and one that requires some additional explanation.

When I use the term “faction,” it should be viewed as a separate strain of ideology, or an ideal type, not as an actual form of organization within the GOP. The four “factions” are very different ways of looking at politics and the world that are not always easy to harmonize;  hence, the ongoing disunity of the GOP.

Since no one “faction” is large enough by itself to win elections, at least at a national level, hardly any prominent member of the GOP can be characterized purely as one or another.  Applying my standards to some of your favorite people, here is what you get:

1.  While both Rand Paul and Ted Cruz are clearly part CL and part Reactionary, the mixtures are different.  Paul is essentially a CL, but must accept Reactionary doctrines on social issues to get elected;  Cruz is primarily a Reactionary who sucks up to the Koch brothers on economic issues.
2.  Donald Trump’s ideology, if you could call it that, is self-adoration, but in practice, he is a Reactionary who espouses PBP ideas on tax cuts and deregulation in order to win support from the GOP donor class.
3. I think that if you could strip the innumerable layers of opportunism away from Rubio, he would be a CD.  He has been more willing to consider ideas about tax cuts that are heretical to PBPs than any other prominent member of the GOP.  His idealism about human rights also fits the CD mold.  When push comes to shove with the donor class on economic issues, however, he falls into line with the other PBPs.
4.  Jeb Bush, like his brother, is a PBP on tax cuts and deregulation, and a CD on everything else.  So is Mitt Romney–hence, my references to the “Romney Coalition.”  John Kasich is also a member of this group, which is typically identified as the “moderate” grouping within the GOP.
5.  Paul Ryan is part Reactionary, part PBP.  So is Mike Pence.

If anyone has questions about any other GOP figure, please let me know.

 

 

The Senate bill is, of course, a substantive disaster–more on that subject over the weekend.  For today, the question is, will it pass?

There are four conservatives with “concerns.”  Rand Paul is the only one of them with any principles;  I expect him to vote no.  The others will hold out for additional concessions until the last minute, but McConnell will correctly perceive them as yes votes, and will refuse to make any significant deals.  They will capitulate.

I can’t see Susan Collins voting for the bill without significant changes that are unlikely to occur.  The other “moderates” will be bought off with McConnell promises that are unrelated to health care.  The vote will be 50-50.  Pence will break the tie, and the bill will pass.

                   Asset Mountains

(Chorus)

Oh, to live with asset mountains.

Piles of cash lying everywhere.

Investors happy with asset mountains

But the country isn’t getting anywhere.

 

Life is good at the exchange.

A billion bucks is pocket change.

Our tax cuts are on the way.

The cat is gone; the mice will play.

 

(Chorus)

 

We’re disposing of Dodd-Frank.

Screw the people!  Free the banks!

Working people made their choice

But the Trumpster hears our voice.

 

(Chorus)

 

Parody of “Sugar Mountain” by Neil Young.

It’s November, 2017.  The Conservative-led coalition has fallen apart as a result of internal battles over Brexit and natural attrition through by-elections.  After the general election, Corbyn took power at the head of a coalition that also included Scottish and Welsh nationalists and the Liberal Democrats.  What did the government look like?

Here’s my guess:

1.  Scotland:  Corbyn had to agree to a new referendum on independence, on a date established by the SNP, in order to get the SNP to join his government. Playing the long game for once, he didn’t object, because he figured that the referendum would fail, and that the disgruntled SNP voters would then drift back to Labour.  He was right.

2.  Brexit:  Corbyn had no emotional attachment to the EU, but the logic inherent in his political position drove him to support the softest possible Brexit.  British business sighed with relief, and the negotiations, while difficult, went more smoothly than one would have expected.

3.  Donald Trump:  Corbyn’s coalition partners prevented him from doing anything really stupid and left-wing on the economy, but he managed to keep his true believer supporters on board by lashing out at Trump at every possible moment.  His new-found political orthodoxy was consequently masked by his anti-American rhetoric.  This worked, as well.

And so, it is just about possible to believe that a man who clearly isn’t fit to be Prime Minister could have success leading a coalition government.

To me, Nancy Pelosi was one of the unsung heroes of the Obama Administration. Whenever Obama needed votes in the House, she managed to get them, no matter how difficult the issue was politically.  If you think that’s easy, go talk to Paul Ryan.

The GOP machine is fueled by hatred and anger towards blue America.  Since Trump is an embarrassment, and Obama and Clinton are gone, who could possibly make a better lightning rod than a liberal woman from San Francisco? In that respect, the Georgia special election is undoubtedly a harbinger of what is likely to be the GOP’s principal talking point in 2018.

Everyone knew who Obama and Clinton were, but my guess is that there are millions of casual GOP voters who have no idea of who Pelosi is.  Given her record of accomplishment, and further given that hating her can only take the GOP so far, I don’t think it is time to talk about replacing her.

By the end of his administration, Barack Obama had more or less washed his hands of the Syria problem;  he continued to fight IS, but he no longer believed it was practically possible to broker a political deal that removed Assad from power.  Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, was more sanguine;  she supported a no-fly zone even though it created the potential for conflict with the Russians. Candidate Trump, for his part, suggested a deal with Assad and the Russians to focus on the destruction of IS.  You could call that position foolish or heartless, but you couldn’t say it was logically incoherent.

But that was then, and this is now.  Trump’s missile attack on the Syrians could be dismissed as a one-off effort to impress everyone with how tough he was without running any real risk of conflict.  Shooting down a Syrian plane, on the other hand, creates the potential for war with Syria and Russia.  It is a very big deal indeed.

There is a case to be made for what amounts to the Clinton position on a no-fly zone.  The problem is that Trump hasn’t made it, either to the world or to the American people.  No one can tell exactly what his position is, which is the way he likes it.  That could result in the US and Russia stumbling unwittingly into war.

The only thing dumber than starting a superpower conflict over an issue that doesn’t affect our vital interests, without really intending to, would be to deliberately start a war to prove that you aren’t a Russian puppet.  That could be on the table, too.

 

The Moral Majority was riding high in the early eighties;  they had a powerful ally in Ronald Reagan, and he was extremely popular.  It appeared that the sky was the limit. Today, fundamentalist Christians have been reduced to engaging in a cynical tactical alliance with a man who repudiates all of their values in order to protect their ideological interests.  Church attendance is falling, and the talk is not of a “moral majority,” but of the “Benedict Option” of withdrawal from an overwhelmingly pagan society.

What went wrong?  Two things:

1.  The connection with the Republican Party boomeranged.  The alliance with the GOP created three very serious problems.  First, Christianity became connected in the eyes of the public, not with love and public service, but with angry Trump and Cruz voters screaming about immigration and socialism, which was not exactly a selling point to younger people.  Second, the libertarian wing of the GOP was only too successful in convincing the public that the government, and by extension other forms of authority, should give way to the desires of the individual, who knew what was best for him.  If the government had no right to be in my business, what right did it have to be in my bedroom? Third, by rejecting science, particularly with regard to climate change, the GOP and the fundamentalists made themselves look ignorant.

2.  The treatment of gay marriage by the courts was a serious blow to the right.  The gay marriage decision essentially told Christians that thousands of years of tradition and moral teachings were now worse than useless, and that anyone who believed as they did would be dismissed as a bigot.  This transition was jarring, to say the least;  it made Christians feel unwelcome in their own home.  Is it any surprise they voted to “Make America Great Again?”

That would be Paul Ryan, who keeps pushing his border adjustment tax even though he has been told repeatedly that it can’t pass either the House or the Senate.  Why?

There are three potential reasons:

1. He thinks it is the best way to head off more damaging protectionist measures;
2. He genuinely believes that, leaving political concerns aside, it is good for American business; or
3. He truly believes that some reasonable attempt should be made to keep the massive corporate tax cut that is coming revenue-neutral.

I’m agnostic on the merits of BAT.  For once, however, all of these explanations do some credit to the king of the magic asterisk.  In today’s environment, that means BAT is doomed;  if you don’t believe it, just keep your eye on the progress of AHCA, the product of unvarnished legislative cynicism.

At first glance, Bill Clinton looks like a much luckier and hornier version of Jimmy Carter:  both were southern governors whose limited enduring domestic accomplishments (welfare reform; deregulation) were GOP-friendly.  Clinton, of course, had the good fortune to be president after the end of the Cold War and during an economic boom;  Carter had no such luck.

One major difference between the two is that Clinton tried and failed to create a more or less universal health care system, while Carter didn’t even try.  In fact, Carter’s lack of ambition, given the Democratic majorities that he enjoyed in Congress in the post-Watergate years, is quite striking.  The key to this is the massive difference in the political climate between 1976 and 1992.  In 1976, while the evolution of the GOP had begun, it was still more of a modest than a conservative party, while the Democrats still ruled the southern states.  As a result, just having a Democratic majority didn’t necessarily mean much in terms of the likelihood of liberal reforms.  By 1992, on the other hand, the evolution was close to being complete;  the GOP had been transformed by Reagan into a swaggering, tax cutting party, and it controlled Congress throughout a substantial portion of the Clinton presidency.

The bottom line is that Reagan made a dramatic change in the political landscape of this country, and his cold hand is still being felt even in times that present completely different challenges.

Given the obvious similarities between the recent events and Watergate, but a very different political climate, it is fair to ask what would have happened if Nixon had enjoyed the support of Fox News and the rest of today’s right-wing media.  How would American history have been different if Nixon had succeeded in retaining the support of his base, and had consequently survived the impeachment process?

Carter would still have been the Democratic nominee in 1976.  On the Republican side, Gerald Ford would have run, not as the incumbent president, but as Nixon’s unelected sidekick.  Reagan undoubtedly would have run against him and promised a new, cleaner, and much more conservative version of the GOP.  It is likely, under these changed circumstances, that he would have prevailed.

And so, the Carter/Reagan race would have occurred in 1976, not 1980.  Instead of being a discredited incumbent, Carter would have looked fresh and new, while Reagan would have been saddled with the ugly legacy of the Nixon years, and a public looking for change.  My guess is that Carter would have won fairly easily, and there never would have been a Reagan Revolution.  George H.W. Bush would have been elected in 1980, and the GOP and the country would look very different today.