Cromwell

The issue isn’t whether sending troops to LA was necessary (it wasn’t), whether the demonstrations had turned into something like riots (they had), or whether the troops were accomplishing anything useful (they weren’t). No, the question now is how far Trump is prepared to press the issue. Is this the point where troops are sent all over the country to shoot peaceful protesters? Will Trump attempt to replace the governments of blue states? TBD.

I predicted last year that public protests against immigration policy would provide the equivalent of the Reichstag Fire if Trump had the audacity to use it. Nothing in the last few days has caused me to change my mind, although it has not happened yet.

In 1687, it must have seemed like James II’s road to autocracy was clear. Monmouth was dead, the long-desired standing army was in place, and Parliament was reasonably cooperative. In a year, however, it had all disappeared; it turned out James’ base of support was a mile wide and an inch deep. How did it all go wrong?

Overreach and incompetence are the wannabe autocrat’s worst enemies, and the liberal’s best friends. Any government that ignores the limits of its mandate, drives out experts, and only listens to the gut of a single eminently fallible man is bound to fail. Really, can anyone name a reactionary autocrat who didn’t bring disaster to his people?

On the once-again President Trump.

Elon Musk has made him quite a grump.

While the bromance is done,

You can’t say Elon won

Because Tesla is in a big slump.

It is doubtful that Trump subscribes to many of RFK’s unconventional views on health care. He nominated RFK for three reasons: to repay a campaign debt; to blow up the establishment he so despises; and to own the libs. Is that enough to keep the relationship going?

No. RFK is already annoying members of Congress from rural areas who represent Trump’s base. Furthermore, Trump will be blamed if anything goes seriously wrong in the public health field, which seems quite likely. RFK’s projected shelf life is around a year.

A note to my readers: I will be on vacation through 6/9. Regular posting will resume on 6/10.

Like Howard “Our beef is beautiful, Europe’s is weak” Lutnick, Scott Bessent has Trump’s patter down cold. When he was asked about yesterday’s judicial decision on the tariffs, he noted in his reply that Donald Trump always wins. That’s the spirit!

But is it true? Is Trump’s record an unbroken series of wins since Inauguration Day? Let’s look at the record:

1. Trump said he would end the Ukraine conflict on Day 1. His mediation and arbitration efforts have flopped. Now he’s threatening to just walk away.
2. The Gaza war has continued in spite of his threats to Hamas.
3. He attacked the Houthis, expended lots of ammunition, and then backed off when it became obvious that he wasn’t accomplishing anything.
4. He has lost far more often than he has won on a variety of issues in court even though the odds, in the form of customary judicial deference, are stacked in his favor.
5. He has only one sort-of agreement to show for all of his tariffs.
6. He single-handedly lost the elections in Canada and Australia for the conservative parties.

Does that sound like a great record to you?

David Brooks has a ferocious column attacking the indifference of J.D. Vance and Patrick Deneen to liberal democratic values in today’s NYT. Since Brooks has been an influential conservative much longer than J.D., his passion on this subject should be a source of concern to the New Right.

Brooks argues that Americans throughout history have been willing to fight and die for abstract ideals, not just their homeland and its traditions. He’s right. I would add the following two comments:

1. J.D. and Deneen are conservative Catholics. If they are right that people only fight for their families and neighbors, how do they explain the Crusades?
2. On the other hand, J.D.’s form of tribalism only extends to conservative Americans with rural backgrounds. In his world, Americans only fight for other people if they have fundamentally similar ideas about politics and culture; nobody from Kentucky would willingly sacrifice his life for a New York liberal. That’s a pitifully weak form of blood and soil nationalism.

The U.S. Court of International Trade just invalidated several of Trump’s tariffs on the basis that they exceed his powers under the “emergency” statute that supposedly authorized them. What happens next?

Two things. First, tariffs are a huge part of Trump’s political identity, so don’t expect him to take this lying down. He will do everything possible to avoid complying with the order; open defiance is a real possibility. Second, when the Supreme Court ultimately decides this case, as it will, Roberts will be faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, as a prominent PBP, he probably thinks the tariffs are bad policy and worse politics. On the other hand, he almost certainly views them as being primarily an economic and political issue, not one involving fundamental legal rights, which should be judged by the electorate on their success or failure.

Roberts made a political decision to preserve the essence of Obamacare. My guess is that he will view tariffs as being the right-wing equivalent of health care and vote accordingly.

According to the NYT, Wall Street investors are putting lots of money into the TACO trade—TACO being an acronym for “Trump always chickens out.” When asked about this, Trump predictably went ballistic. What does this mean for the future?

The negotiations with the EU were never likely to succeed. Now, with Trump’s manhood on the line, the prospects for a deal are even worse.

In an interview in today’s NYT, Elissa Slotkin argues that the Democrats failed to understand how angry the public was about the economy and didn’t have a persuasive argument for change. As I’ve noted many times, however, Joe Biden did have an ambitious plan to make fundamental changes to the economy for the benefit of workers in 2020, but it failed in the face of inflation, intolerably slow implementation, bad salesmanship, and a lack of votes in the Senate. The Democrats could not run as change agents in 2024 because their plan for change had already run aground. What does this mean for next time?

It will be even harder to accomplish major reforms after 2028 than it was after 2020 because the debt and the cost of money have gone up significantly in the interim. That means a progressive plan to expand the welfare state will have to be funded by major tax increases, and not just on the very wealthy, to be plausible. The alternative will be to push the lower cost abundance agenda and downplay wealth redistribution; that was the model used successfully by the Labour Party last year. Getting rid of the Trump tariffs will, of course, be the centerpiece of the plan.

Will the electorate be willing to accept tax increases in exchange for additional economic security? We’ll find out in 2028; it won’t be necessary to talk about the tradeoff in 2026.

Trump, to his great credit, is not a warmonger, and he has not shown any interest in becoming Bibi’s lawn guy in Iran. So where does Bibi go from here?

He is greatly admired by a large segment of the GOP. He can start banging the drums for war in conservative circles. Would Trump be able to resist that?

Two observations are pertinent here. First, as much as the right embraces Israeli aggression, it probably fears Trump’s wrath more, at least at this stage of his presidency. Second, Trump has succeeded in defining any public criticism of Israel by the blue team as antisemitism. It would be ironic indeed if Bibi could quietly turn that argument against him.

The Brazilian government has kept relatively quiet in the face of Trump’s efforts to dominate the hemisphere. The truth, however, is that Trump and the current Brazilian regime are natural enemies. Brazil has a large population, extensive business ties with China, and a left-leaning leader who displaced Trump’s ideological twin. Can the uneasy peace last?

I don’t think so. Expect Brazil to become vocally anti-Trump in the near future. How far will Trump go to put an end to the unwelcome dissent in his backyard? TBD.

Trump clearly views the Western Hemisphere as a sphere of exclusive American influence. Some commentators argue that he is just following the Monroe Doctrine. Is that true?

The Monroe Doctrine was an expression of American desire to prevent reactionary post-Napoleonic European regimes–primarily Spain–from throttling revolutions in South America. The US did not have the strength or the will to do this on its own, let alone dominate South America by itself. The hard work there was actually done by the British fleet. In fact, in some ways the Monroe Doctrine was a sympathetic reaction to British attempts to maintain the South American markets won during the recent war.

Conditions are much different today. The US is the greatest military power in the world. Trump doesn’t simply seek to keep foreigners from dominating the rest of the hemisphere, as Monroe did; he wants to dominate it himself. That may be a logical application of the Monroe Doctrine to changed circumstances, but it isn’t the same thing at all.

Trump’s efforts at mediation and arbitration have failed miserably, as any reasonable person would have predicted. Where does he go now?

It is painfully obvious that he has no intention of providing any significant additional military assistance to Ukraine. That leaves him with three options: to cut off transfers of American weapons, but to continue with intelligence sharing and to acquiesce to European transfers to Ukraine; to eliminate the intelligence sharing, but to at least do nothing to stop the Europeans from helping; or to use his position in NATO to prevent the Europeans from providing assistance. Under the first scenario, Ukraine will probably lose more ground, but should keep its independence; under the second, its sovereignty is in serious jeopardy; under the third, America is effectively a Putin ally, NATO will splinter, and Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state.

To put it in simple Trumpian terms, how many cards will Zelensky be permitted to play from this point forward? TBD.

We’re on the other side with Hamilton and Jefferson again. Let’s listen in!

J: What’s wrong, Alex? You seem really down again.

H: It’s those idiotic Trump tariffs. He’s doing everything he can to ruin our country.

J: I don’t get it. You supported tariffs when you were in power. Why the change?

H: Tariffs can be justified in the name of national security or when you’re trying to protect vital infant industries from unfair foreign competition. In addition, tariffs were one of the few practical ways to fund the government in the 18th century. Trump’s tariffs don’t have any of those justifications.

J: True. It’s hard to know what he’s trying to accomplish. And he keeps changing them. It looks like he just wants to be at the center of the universe.

H: I read somewhere that he just likes tariffs, and that everyone around him is trying to reverse engineer them to make sense. That’s about as plausible an explanation as any.

J: I certainly can’t figure it out. It looks like he’s trying to rebuild the economy of the 1950s. Why stop there? Why not go back to our day, like the Supreme Court?

H: Anyway, as far as I’m concerned, the tariffs are your fault.

J: Me? I was a free trader from day one. I believed in low taxes and minimal government. Tariffs aren’t consistent with that.

H: But you were a populist, just like Trump. And the tariffs are just a counterproductive exercise in playing to the gallery.

J: By the standards of the day, I was a left-wing populist, not a right-winger like Trump. And Trump isn’t really a populist. He just plays one on TV while he cuts taxes and regulations for big shots. You would appreciate that.

H: Not really. We can discuss that some other time. But you’ve convinced me for now. This is just on Trump and the fools that voted for him. God only knows where it ends, but it won’t be good.

J: Let’s leave it at that.

I’m reading a lot of rumblings that the Senate plans significant changes to the House bill. Is that likely to happen?

The ideological makeup of the Senate, at least as it pertains to taxing and spending issues, mirrors that of the House. Johnson and Paul are the Senate equivalents of, say, Massie and Chip Roy; they are unhappy about the increase in the deficit, and they may well vote no. Hawley purports to be an economic populist, but he is extremely ambitious and stands to lose if he bucks the party line; he will, in the end, cave and vote yes. McConnell, Collins, and Murkowski have issues with Trump on lots of other issues, but not on taxing and spending priorities. They voted for the 2017 bill, and they will do it again. All of the others just want to keep Trump and the donor class happy, so they will vote for whatever is put in front of them.

In short, something very similar to the House bill will scrape through with a one or two vote majority after lots of grunting and groaning. Then J.D. Vance will tell us that legislation which primarily helps the rich and cuts food and medical benefits for struggling white workers is consistent with MAGA ideology because it temporarily eliminates taxes on overtime and tips.