On Ryan’s Regrets

Regrets? Paul Ryan apparently has a few, according to excerpts of a new biography that were discussed in a Politico article. Ryan knows that he’s going to go down in history as a Trump enabler, he sees Trump’s impact on our civic values, and he’s not happy about either. He’s not throwing the big tax cut back, though.

It’s important to remember that everything could have been different, at least on paper. Trump could have put himself up for sale to either party and proposed genuinely populist policies, and the GOP could have treated him as a third party candidate with whom they would only make temporary alliances of convenience. That didn’t happen. Both completely embraced the other, and both are now stuck with each other, for worse.

Why did that happen? Part of it was just a lack of imagination, I suspect. But the biggest part simply was that the GOP cannot win elections without the assistance of his reactionary followers. There was no practical way for most GOP officeholders to treat Trump in a way that would offend about 40 percent of their voters, so they didn’t try. The rest is history.

An Aphorism for Mueller

“Blessed is he who expects nothing, for he shall never be disappointed.”

It wasn’t a disaster, unless you were foolish enough to think that Mueller would be some sort of white knight riding to the rescue of the nation. It probably didn’t do any lasting harm. It was just stupid.

On the Future of National Conservatism

The foundation of the current GOP is a deal between Reactionaries and PBPs wherein the latter get deregulation and regressive tax cuts and the former get support on social and cultural issues. For a variety of reasons, including the influence of Fox News, the establishment’s failure in Iraq, stagnant wages, the election of an African-American president, and some ringing defeats in the culture wars, the Reactionaries have become more militant, and are talking about renegotiating the deal. The discussion regarding industrial policy at the National Conservative conclave is the logical result of that process; some Reactionaries want to scrap the deal with business interests and impose economic ideas that are anathema to CLs and PBPs on the rest of the party.

Does the concept of a GOP completely dominated by the ideas of Reactionaries have a future? In the short run, probably not; inertia will most likely drive the party back to its Reaganite small government rhetoric once Trump is out of power, particularly if the next Democratic president is a left-wing populist. In addition, the GOP cannot win elections without votes and campaign contributions from business interests; notwithstanding what Trump thinks, Reactionaries are only a plurality within his own party, and a minority within the electorate as a whole. In the long run, however, it depends on how far left the Democrats move. Businessmen would object to the loss of influence within the GOP, but if they are presented with a stark choice between fascism and socialism, they will sit down, shut up, and provide votes for the former every time.

One thing is for certain: if the Democrats want to respond to “national conservatism” by creating a new label for their evolving populist ideology, it had better not be “national socialism.”

On George Will and American Conservatism

There really aren’t many prominent CLs in public life. Rand Paul is as close to a pure CL politician as you can find in Washington, but even he has to make plenty of concessions to the Reactionary faction of the GOP to get re-elected. The Koch brothers are CLs, but their positions are motivated at least in part by self-interest. And then there is George Will.

Will has a new book out. I have not read it, but I have seen reviews and read an interview with him about it on Vox. The centerpiece of it seems to be a distinction between European and American conservatism. In a nutshell, Will contends that European conservatism is rooted in loathing of revolution and the desire to protect existing institutions, whereas American conservatism is based on a very different historical experience, and is focused on preventing tyranny at the federal level, not avoiding societal change.

There is something to his theory; colonists, by definition, were embracing change, not defending existing institutions, and the American Revolution was portrayed by many as a battle against an overreaching central authority. There are a number of weaknesses in the argument, however, including the following:

  1. Will, like many other members of the right, incorrectly views the Constitution as a device created to limit federal power. The Founding Fathers were hardly united on this point, but the purpose in ditching the Articles of Confederation was to strengthen the central authority, not to weaken it.
  2. Large corporations obviously didn’t exist at the time the Constitution was written. The Founding Fathers, with the possible exception of Hamilton, could not have foreseen the degree to which national and even multi-national corporations would dominate economic life in this country. A strong central government is the only institution that can keep them in check. Would Jefferson have abandoned his notions of limited federal power under the present circumstances? We can never know for sure, but I would say the answer is probably yes.
  3. There are plenty of European-style conservatives, who simply dislike all forms of change, in this country.

I don’t agree with the CLs about very much, but they have a certain intellectual integrity that one has to admire. Will can come off as a doddering old fool at times, but at least he hates Donald Trump, because he correctly views Trump as a threat to principled, limited government. At least give him credit for that.

On Warren and National Conservatives

Much is being made of a meeting of so-called “national conservatives” last week. In my terminology, “national conservatives” are just the Reactionary faction of the GOP; the point of the convention was to give better definition to their ideology.

Most of the headlines revolved around racism and immigration policy, but the more interesting bit pertained to the economy. Historically, Reactionaries have deferred to the PBP agenda of regressive tax cuts and deregulation in exchange for votes and financial support on racial, social, and cultural issues. The speakers at last week’s convention, however, urged the group to get behind a much larger role for the federal government: increased social spending, particularly for declining rural areas; subsidies and protection for sensitive industries; and support, in general, for white workers over business interests.

It wouldn’t be too much to call this industrial policy, and it sounds a lot like Warren’s agenda. Some speakers at the convention even acknowledged that, while going on to make it clear that she appalls them for lots of other reasons.

Is this a potential opening for her in a general election campaign? Only to a limited extent, because Reactionaries are primarily concerned with identity issues, and a white female Harvard professor is about the worst possible candidate to win them over on those grounds. Still, it suggests some potential points of agreement between the parties in the future, and that may prove to be significant.

On Trump and BoJo the Clown

Donald Trump and Boris Johnson have plenty in common. Both view politics more as a form of entertainment than public service or a battle of ideas; neither has much of a fixed ideology; both believe in the same kind of smashmouth negotiating style; neither has much regard for the truth; and both have a tremendous sense of self-worth. It is no wonder that Trump sees BoJo as a kindred spirit.

And yet, there are significant differences, too. BoJo is an experienced politician, not a businessman. He doesn’t treat the press as a public enemy, which makes sense, since his background is in journalism. He’s much more intelligent and well-informed than Trump–not that the bar is very high. Finally, and most importantly, BoJo will be operating under different constraints than Trump is, because the votes of a handful of Conservative activists do not represent any sort of mandate within the country.

My prediction? There will be a general election very shortly. The principal issue in the election will, of course, be Brexit. The Conservatives will run as a militantly pro-Brexit party; the anti-Brexit vote will be split between Labour and the Lib Dems as a result of Corbyn’s failure to embrace the second referendum; the Conservatives will consequently win big even though the anti-Brexit vote will be larger; and a no-deal Brexit will be the outcome, with disastrous results for the UK.

Can Biden Bounce Back?

The luck of the draw did Biden no favors; it put him in a group with two hungry identity politicians–Harris and Booker. He’s clearly more vulnerable from the identity side of the graph than he is from the fundis.

How can he improve his performance? Here are some ideas:

  1. GET AN EARLIER WAKEUP CALL: Too many of his answers at the first debate were tentative and rambling. Harris hurt him, not because anyone really thinks he’s a bigot, but because she made him look like a loser. The whole rationale for his candidacy is his ability to win in 2020; if he loses that, he’s done. More, and better, preparation is the key.
  2. BEWARE OF BOOKER: Booker needs to peel realo votes from him to remain viable in the race. Expect him to attack early and often on identity issues.
  3. CHANGE THE SUBJECT: Talk about Trump and make the realo case as often and forcefully as possible. Warren and Sanders may provide some opportunities with their statements on the previous night.
  4. HARRIS IS A FLIP-FLOPPER: Harris is vulnerable on her record as a prosecutor, but Biden isn’t positioned to make that case. Instead, focus on her inability to decide whether she is a realo or a fundi, particularly on health care. Presidents have to make hard decisions, after all.
  5. DON’T OVERREACT: There will be a temptation to come out being too aggressive to compensate for last month’s fiasco. Don’t do it. Remain as calm and affable as possible.

How the Left is Won

Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren are in a struggle to win over the progressive base. They will share the stage on the first night of the debate next week. Should we expect fireworks?

No. Their voters are actually demographically different; Sanders supporters tend to be male and poorly educated, while Warren appeals to women and the highly-educated. Second, they appear to get along pretty well. Third, while their intellectual approaches to problems are different (and that matters), their positions on the kinds of issues that will be debated are pretty much the same. As a result, their battles will be muted; Warren will probably gently remind America that she isn’t a socialist, and Bernie will make it clear that he supported Medicare-for-all before it was cool. That’s about it.

How will the left be won? Primarily through friendly pundits and surrogates, over a period of several months. In the meantime, both of them will probably go after Biden to some extent, and the real drama will come if Mayor Pete, or one of the also-rans, makes the realo case against both of them. I think that will happen; whether it will work or not remains to be seen.

On Iran and Europe

The Iranians apparently believe they can flip the Europeans against the Americans by applying pressure. Will it work?

No. First of all, unlike any of his predecessors, Trump doesn’t care what they think. Second, several of their leaders (presumably including Boris Johnson) are friends of his. Third, they are far more dependent on American goodwill than Iran’s. Fourth, they have no reason to trust a country with a history of lying on nuclear issues and committing terrorist acts on their soil. Finally, they are largely ineffectual, anyway.

In the end, they will wring their hands about Trump’s decision to scrap the nuclear agreement, and they will do their best to talk both sides out of war, but they won’t do anything meaningful to restrain Trump if and when he decides that war is necessary.

You would think that the Iranians would turn to Putin, their supposed ally, for support here, but they know he would sell them out in a heartbeat for something he really wants. They would be wiser to put their money on Xi. He needs their oil, and he’s much less dangerous as a friend.

The Problem with Base Mobilization

There are three conceptually different models for a successful Democratic candidacy in 2020:

  1. The “revolution”–persuading reactionary white workers to vote for their economic interests over their cultural preferences;
  2. The united front–moving to the center and picking off moderates disillusioned by Trump, including Never Trumpers, suburban women, principled conservatives, and some business interests; and
  3. Base mobilization–convincing reluctant minority and millennial voters to go to the polls with promises of shiny new government programs and extreme statements on cultural issues.

At this point, no one, including Sanders, is really trying #1, which would probably require the Democratic Party to make concessions to the right on cultural issues. #2 is consistent with the outcome of the midterms and has plenty of history behind it. Many leftist pundits, however, are pushing for #3, which is, of course, the Trumpian model.

Assume, for purposes of argument, that #3 can generate millions of new blue votes, even though there is very little historical support for that premise. Assume further that exacerbating existing national divisions by engaging in Trumpian tactics doesn’t present any future issues in governing the country. My question is, if you succeed in mobilizing the base, where are the additional blue votes going to be cast? Winning California by another million votes accomplishes precisely nothing in the big picture.

If the Democrats want to win and get something done, they are going to have to flip purple, and possibly even red, states. Moving to the left on both cultural and economic issues isn’t going to accomplish that.

On Wokeness in 2030

White America is divided into three groups:

  1. A very small percentage (mostly millennials) is woke. These people view American history as a narrative in oppression and are eager to do penance in the form of reparation payments. The lunar landing would be a timely illustration of the woke mentality; while most of us consider it to be a remarkable, unifying story of American accomplishment, a woke person would say it is just another example of minority oppression, because all three Apollo 11 astronauts were white men.
  2. A much larger percentage, but not a majority, is defiantly unwoke. These folks not only reject the notion of white privilege; they assert that white people are victims, and that minorities are the true privileged group, because they receive a boatload of undeserved government benefits and cuts in line. Lindsey Graham’s Rosa-in-reverse statement during the Kavanaugh hearing about the white man refusing to be silenced as a classic example of this mentality.
  3. The rest of us, including me, think that white victimhood is a bad joke, and acknowledge the reality of racism on a daily basis, but do not accept the notion of white privilege or any obligation to pay reparations.

So where is this debate going? Will the center hold?

I have my doubts. Demographics and momentum are on the side of the woke. The backlash from the unwoke is likely to be ferocious. It’s hard to be optimistic that good sense will ultimately prevail.

Love Trump or Leave America

Richard Nixon’s most potent weapon in his waning days as president was his ability to wrap himself in the flag and portray his opponents as bad Americans. I predicted years ago that Trump would ultimately do the same thing. He is just starting to prove me, and Dr. Johnson, right.

If you think this is bad, wait until the war starts.

The right, of course, had a completely different attitude about strident opposition to the government when Barack Obama was president. If you were to ask a reactionary why he views criticism of Trump, but not Obama, as unpatriotic, he would wind up having to admit that he thinks Trump is a real American, and Obama was not. In the final analysis, that is the difference between deep red and deep blue people; the latter view the former is second-class Americans, but the former view the latter is not being Americans at all.

On Bernie, Jeremy, and Identity

To Jeremy Corbyn, it’s always 1945, when the national divisions revolved almost exclusively around class. Corbyn is a Marxist, and has no use for identity politics, which he views as a distraction created by capitalists to divide the working class. That’s why he can’t really embrace the opposition to Brexit and the second referendum; he would have to leave behind the millions of pro-Brexit reactionary workers that he views as the true backbone of his party. And that is why he will lead Labour into an abyss at the next election, which may be sooner than you think.

Bernie Sanders, as you would expect, feels much the same way. Bernie’s Marxist background tells him that the battle in America that matters is between oppressed workers and big business. He understands identity politics, and has made some grudging concessions to them this time around in order to win the election. He will never embrace them, however.

There can’t be any serious doubt that Bernie’s heart is in the right place on issues of race and sexual identity; he has always identified with downtrodden people, and he always will. Due to his obsession with the class struggle, however, Bernie is not woke, and he never will be.

And that is one really big reason why he won’t get the nomination in 2020.

Checking Privilege at the Airport

(This never happened, but based on an article in the NYT, it easily could have.)

I was grinding my way through an unbearably long TSA line at the airport when I saw a middle-aged African-American woman coming to join the line. Even from a distance, I could see that she was checking me out. She was stereotyping me. She saw me as an oppressor. I was the kind of guy who would flaunt his white privilege.

I considered my options. Should I speak to her? If I didn’t, she might interpret my hauteur as a form of white privilege. If I did, however, she would probably think I was trying to dominate the situation, which was just another form of white privilege.

And then there were her possible reactions. Would she think my place in line ahead of her was another form of white privilege? Would she believe that I had stolen it from a worthier African-American? Would she assert her black privilege to attribute what I considered my earned place in line to racism, and play the victim card?

I temporized. I decided I would speak only if she spoke first; that was the ideal outcome. In the event, she didn’t, and I could only hope for the best.

Meanwhile, the line trudged on. When I finally got to the front of the line, they asked me to take out my tablet, but no one demanded to check my white privilege. Thank God.