Shortly before Trump took office in January, 2017, I predicted that he would jam a regressive tax cut through Congress, that the deficit would explode as a result, that the Fed would raise interest rates to respond to an overheated economy, and that we would fall into a recession. I was right on the first two points. But on the third, the Fed pulled back after the “taper tantrum,” without any apparently negative results. With no interest rate increase, we had the Trump pre-pandemic economy, with real wages increasing substantially, even for people with minimal skills. The electorate’s memory of that Brigadoon is the reason the election was as close as it was, even with Trump’s uncaring and inept response to the pandemic.
Trump sold his tax cut as a supply side measure that would vastly increase investment. On that point, it was (predictably) a miserable failure. Instead, the unintended consequence was something like Abenomics in America. What does Japan’s experience tell us about what we can expect if Biden continues on his present course?
There are actually four questions here:
- Are America and Japan essentially similar?
- Did Abenomics work?
- What are the actual risks involved in supercharging the economy with spending increases and tax cuts?
- Are they worth it?
The answer to #1 is mixed; like Japan, America is aging and becoming somewhat stagnant, but to a lesser degree, due to higher levels of immigration and a less regulated economy. Japan’s debt, as a percentage of GDP, is much higher, but so is its domestic savings rate. On #2, we also have a mixed bag; the government didn’t succeed in raising the country from its comfortable torpor, but it at least managed to keep things from getting worse.
Paul Krugman and the administration argue that the benefits of a huge stimulus, as opposed to targeted relief, outweigh the risks; based on the Trump era experience and that of Japan, the likelihood of inflation and an increase in interest rates is low, and if it should happen, the Fed can just take care of it by slamming on the brakes. It is possible, of course, that inflation expectations are so low today that inflation and interest rates will not increase much, in which case they will be proved right. But the raw materials for inflation–supply chain bottlenecks, huge piles of savings, a trade war with China, and enormous suppressed demand for entertainment and services–also exist, and a Democratic administration is going to be cut less slack by investors and the Fed than Trump was.
If inflation increases and interest rates follow, both the stock market and the bond market will be crushed; as I noted in a previous post, America is now hooked on low interest rates. We will have another “taper tantrum,” except on a much larger scale, and with no subsequent relief from the Fed and the markets. What happens then? The wealthy and the modestly affluent respond to their loss of wealth by cutting back their spending, and recession follows. Politically, this is a disaster. It’s what I predicted for Trump, only a few years later, with the GOP responding with demands for huge cuts in spending on the safety net.
So, are the benefits worth the risks? It’s a much closer call than Krugman would suggest. I would say no. We’re probably about to find out.