On the ex-KGB man Vlad Putin.
He invaded Ukraine, you’re darn tootin’.
It was easy, he thought
But Ukrainians fought.
Now there’s no end in sight to the shootin’.
On the ex-KGB man Vlad Putin.
He invaded Ukraine, you’re darn tootin’.
It was easy, he thought
But Ukrainians fought.
Now there’s no end in sight to the shootin’.
Biden has always been very clear: the US has no treaty obligations to Ukraine, and will not risk World War III for it. The border of NATO is his red line. It is the correct one.
The Ukrainian government, quite naturally, wants to blur the line, and fight Russia to the last American. They have little to lose, so who can blame them? It’s our job to say no for the sake of ourselves and the rest of the world, not theirs.
Xi probably viewed his alliance with Putin the same way Stalin viewed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: an opportunity to sit back and watch the US and Russia batter each other to pieces, only to his profit. As we know, it didn’t work out that way in the end.
Instead, the partnership is starting to look more like Hitler bailing out Mussolini after the latter’s North Africa misadventure. That didn’t work out too well, either.
The left has every reason to hate Putin; he’s a bully, a fascist, and the ally and prototype for Donald Trump. Its support for Ukraine in the war was, therefore, never in question. But what about the GOP, which apparently has left the Trump years behind? Does this mean it is in the process of becoming a responsible center-right party again?
Don’t hold your breath; I predicted this years ago. Republicans are simply rediscovering that their identity as the party of toxic masculinity can apply to foreign affairs, as well as to domestic issues, when the wind is blowing from the right direction. They are hoping, through their support of the Ukrainians, to make the electorate forget how they behaved during the Trump years. They are trying to kick left-wing ass and rewrite history concurrently, not to support liberal democracy here or abroad. They are deceiving and compartmentalizing.
If you don’t believe me, just note that Ron DeSantis is arguing that Putin didn’t invade during the Trump years because the man on golf cart–the guy with the pro-Russian campaign manager who withheld assistance from the Ukrainian government for domestic political reasons–was tougher on Russia than Biden.
Here’s where the factions stand on the war:
CDs: The Russian invasion is a brutal, unprovoked violation of international law. It must be resisted by all diplomatic and military means short of war.
CLs: Hey, we weren’t attacked! Overseas military adventures are always a bad idea. Only wars of direct self-defense are acceptable.
PBPs: Wars are bad for business. Do the minimum necessary to keep the situation under control, but nothing more.
Reactionaries: Under normal conditions, we oppose overseas wars–we would rather use the energy to protect the border and own the libs at home. But the Russians are an exception. We’re still disappointed we didn’t get to kick Russian butt at the end of the Cold War. Support the Ukrainians, and drill, baby, drill!
As with most other issues, it is the Reactionary position that controls. The “New Right” is out of step with the rest of the faction on this matter. Putin is no longer a hero to the GOP now that Trump is out of office, as I predicted some time ago.
As I understand it, Nikita Khrushchev made the decision to install missiles in Cuba more or less on his own. His colleagues on the Politburo were less than thrilled by the crisis and its resolution. As a result of this and other fiascos, Khrushchev was removed from power by a coup within the CCCP.
Could the same thing happen as a result of Putin’s foolhardy war against Ukraine? Not exactly, because Putin is not constrained by a party, an ideology, and a bureaucracy in the same way; he runs the whole show himself. The only hope would be that the military and the security apparatus would be sufficiently appalled to refuse to obey orders. That’s a big lift.
A Communist Party as a restraining force in history? It seems implausible at first, but it’s actually true. It is one of the big differences between Xi and Putin.
The way to win a war is to destroy your opponent’s will to fight and to substantially degrade its capacity to do so. Shock and awe attacks do both, which is why I assumed Putin would approach Ukraine in the same way we dealt with Iraq. He didn’t, presumably because he was overconfident and thought he could avoid the global fallout with a less impressive opening. Now he’s facing the worst possible option: a continuing escalation focusing on destroying Ukrainian cities and starving their residents. The horrible footage will be on TV every night. The entire Ukrainian population has been mobilized against him. The world is outraged. A long and expensive occupation is now his best case scenario. It will be a nightmare.
It couldn’t happen to a nicer guy.
When we went to New York in 2019, I posted about how it felt like the center of the world. The pace of life was fast and intense; every possible ethnicity was represented; there was lots of activity on the street; and the power of the place was represented vertically, in skyscrapers.
Washington, D.C. is the antithesis of New York. It’s a company town, and it all revolves around political power. Nobody lives there permanently. There is little activity on the street. Culture only really exists there to serve the wealthy. Unlike New York, power in architecture is expressed horizontally; the massive concrete and stone government buildings are kind of overwhelming in their own way.
Washington doesn’t remind me of any European or Asian capital that I have seen. The visibility and size of the Capitol building, and the presence of the Washington Monument, suggest a vastly larger and more powerful version of the Vatican. That’s a company town with influence all over the world, as well.
“Ireland is ours!” said Boris Johnson, as he announced that the UK was invading Ireland. “We have a common culture and a common language. We controlled Ireland for centuries. Anyway, we can’t let the EU have a bridgehead in an island that is so close to us. We have no choice but to engage in a special military venture!”
Think this sounds ridiculous? No more than Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Putin takes the position that Ukraine has no right to exist as a separate nation due to its ethnic and cultural ties to Russia. The vast majority of Ukrainians, of course, beg to differ.
As a result, the Russian military is being ordered to kill their relatives. It sounds a bit like a domestic dispute involving a guy who would rather kill his girlfriend than let anyone else have her. How inspiring a cause is that? Based on the state of affairs on the ground, not very.
NOTE TO MY READERS: I will be on vacation for the next week. Postings will be sporadic at best until 3/15.
There is every reason to believe that Vladimir Putin is in Ukraine to win it. The Ukrainians and their allies can force the Russians to pay a heavy price, but in the end, they cannot prevail in a purely military sense. That leaves the question–can anyone at home change Putin’s mind as to the costs and benefits of the invasion?
Here are the possibilities:
Realistically, there isn’t much hope here, unless Putin is less committed to the invasion than he appears to be at this time. The best chances are #2 and #3; the most realistic alternative is a grubby compromise that trades NATO and EU membership for sovereignty on other issues.
Kaiser Wilhelm II gave one to the Austro-Hungarian government in 1914; you know how that one turned out. Donald Trump gave one to MBS in Yemen; things didn’t go much better there. It is a really bad idea to give your unconditional support to an unreliable actor, because it turns you into a hostage of fortune.
That’s exactly what Xi has done with Putin in Ukraine. He’s going to be viewed as an accomplice to a crime in the countries that, in the long run, really matter to the Chinese. That’s the opposite of soft power.
Real estate prices are soaring; rent, predictably, has followed. It is becoming an increasingly large component of our current inflationary episode; it also creates serious social problems. Can the Fed do anything about it?
This one is complicated. On the supply side, the problems are the rising cost of materials, the lack of available labor, and density constraints imposed by local governments. The Fed can’t do anything about these issues; in fact, by making financing more difficult for multi-family projects, it might actually make things worse by raising rates. On the demand side, raising interest rates would increase the cost of buying a unit, and thus reduce sales and, ultimately, prices; on the other hand, prices have already gone up dramatically without crushing demand, due largely to demographics and the impacts of the pandemic, so who is to say that increasing the cost of financing would make much of a difference? In addition, a substantial number of sales in the recent past have been for cash. The Fed has no control over those.
On balance, the case for reducing rents by raising rates is unpersuasive.
Gas prices are already soaring, and are about to get worse, as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. This is a classic supply side shock that will inevitably filter through the entire economy in the form of higher prices. What should the Fed do?
The Fed can’t do anything to address supply problems created by geopolitical crises. Crushing demand won’t solve the problem. The American public will respond to higher gas prices by driving and buying less regardless of what the Fed does with interest rates. The best thing the Fed can do is . . . nothing.
The rule is that inflation results when demand overtakes supply. No one disputes that the current inflationary episode is following the rule–at least as to goods. The debate is whether demand in the aggregate (i.e., for both goods and services) is too high, and should be reduced by interest rate hikes, or whether demand for goods has been increased artificially by the pandemic at the expense of services, in which case interest rate hikes will do nothing but punish the markets. Paul Krugman appropriately calls adherents of the first opinion “Overheaters” and the second opinion “Skewers.” Who is correct here?
Based on GDP data and inflation rates in comparable countries, 5 percent of our 7 percent inflation rate is caused by “skewing,” and the remainder by “overheating.” This means only a small portion of the inflation rate can be addressed through interest rate increases. In addition, much of the heightened demand for goods is being financed by pandemic savings, not by borrowing; increasing interest rates won’t solve that problem, either.
The bottom line is that the Fed can do a lot of collateral damage to the economy by raising rates sharply, but it cannot address the root cause of most of the inflation–the pandemic. Increasing rates to their pre-pandemic level is appropriate, as the economy no longer needs extra fuel to burn, but it would be a mistake to do anything more than that.