Cromwell

We have seen over the last few days that the concept of a “clash of civilizations” doesn’t really describe the current geopolitical reality very accurately. The major chord is good old-fashioned great power rivalry, as applied to a multi-polar world; the minor chord is a dispute between authoritarian and liberal government.

You can analogize, without undue difficulty, today’s world to Europe in 1914. China is Imperial Germany–growing rapidly, nationalistic, full of energy and ideas, and desperately looking for respect from its rivals; America is the UK–still the most powerful nation, but with its primacy under threat; the EU is France, in relative decline; and Russia is, well, the Russian Empire-a creepy, imperialist autocracy. The analogy isn’t perfect; ideological differences were less prominent then than they are now, as evidenced by the fact that Nicholas II was related to the British royal family (hence, his son’s hemophilia). It does work, however.

What does that mean for American foreign policy? It means that we are going to have to tolerate cooperating with some very imperfect nations in our quest to keep the revisionist autocratic countries from imposing their rules on the rest of us. That will be awkward at times, but it can be done. We did it every day during the Cold War.

The old Cold War saying was that “Europe was from Venus, and America is from Mars.” Europe promoted liberal democracy through trade, expanding the EU, promoting human rights, and making rules; America, on the other hand, was more likely to use force to accomplish its objectives. Macron has talked at great length about European “sovereignty.” Do we have fuel here for a kind of clash of civilizations?

No. America has become less enamored of using force after Iraq, and the two protagonists have responded in similar fashion to Ukraine. In addition, there are “red” right-wing populist states in Europe as well as in America. Not only do the two parties agree on most of the essentials; they have the same kinds of internal disputes about identity politics. Any distance between the two is consequently based on the logic of interests and foreign policy realism, not culture.

Whether you like him or not, you have to admit that Macron practically oozes intelligence and competence. The record backs him up, too; the French economy is doing well, and unemployment is way down, in spite of the recession.

Notwithstanding the good news, there is a real chance that he could lose the election to a counterrevolutionary populist. The message to Democrats is simple, but scary: delivering the material goods isn’t enough. You have to figure out a way to get the identity politics right, too.

It is fair to assume that a President Le Pen, lacking the legal ability to withdraw from the EU, will follow the Polish and Hungarian playbook and try to render it powerless from within. Given the importance of France to the EU, she could succeed. What then?

Remember, the EU and NATO were created largely to keep the Germans under control. If the two organizations are effectively neutered, the Germans–now more economically and politically dominant in Europe than ever–will have some important decisions to make. One can imagine them developing nuclear weapons and becoming more diplomatically aggressive in order to fill the new security vacuum. Would that outcome be welcomed by the French?

France, be careful what you ask for, because you might get it.

As the saying goes, Islamic extremists hate us as much for who we are as for what we do. They despise our culture. As a result, it makes perfect sense to talk about a clash of civilizations as it pertains to them.

But they don’t count for much after the destruction of ISIS. Iran isn’t really a revolutionary state anymore, and its appeal is limited to Shiite Muslims. Afghanistan is a basket case; it is debatable whether its leaders have much interest in spreading the word outside its boundaries in any event. The principal Islamic states dislike jihadis as much as we do. There just isn’t much fuel available for an international culture war between Christians and Muslims; the more prominent dispute is the centuries-old internal battle between Sunnis and Shiites.

Once again, the clash of civilizations thesis fails the reality test.

Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has been ambivalent about its relationship with the rest of Europe. On the one hand, you have heads of state who viewed Russia as being a backward cousin needing a substantial amount of modernizing; on the other, you have Russian leaders who purported to believe that their country was, and should remain, unique and uncorrupted by the West. Peter, Catherine the Great, Lenin, and Gorbachev were in the first group; Nicholas II and Stalin were in the second.

Putin is advertising himself as a member of the second group. Whether he actually believes his reactionary nationalist drivel is almost beside the point now. The bottom line is that his war with Ukraine–the Abel to Russia’s Cain–can hardly be described as a clash of civilizations; furthermore, Putin has friends among Catholics (the Hungarians) and Muslims (Syria). His ambition to recreate the Russian Empire consequently has no connection with culture wars; it is just old-fashioned imperialism, pure and simple.

This one should be a no-brainer. The French economy is in relatively good shape, particularly in light of the pandemic. Putin is an ally of Le Pen. What more do you need to know?

The problem is that populism is alive and well in France for the same reasons that it is here: animosity among residents of rural areas and decaying 19th century industrial areas towards more affluent knowledge workers and immigrants. In addition to that, Macron frequently comes across as being detached and indifferent. Jupiter didn’t have to present himself for re-election, but Macron does; he appears to forget that at times.

A Le Pen victory would be a disaster for France, the EU, and NATO, but a huge win for Putin. Let’s hope with all of our might that it doesn’t happen.

I’ve got those dirty, lowdown, Ukraine battle blues.

You have to be aware of it; it’s all over the news.

The invasion isn’t going well, and now I’ve got to choose.

If things don’t start improving soon, I’m surely going to lose.

__________________

Should I escalate the war, or should I just refrain?

Should I focus on the east, and really bring the pain?

Attacking NATO is a risk; would it be worth the gain?

One thing that I know for sure–I’m going to take the blame.

________________

I’ve got the blues.

The stuck in Ukraine blues.

I got a lot of bad advice

For that, there’s no excuse.

It’s time to change the narrative

So I can say I won.

I have to have a victory

When all is said and done.

If China were a truly Marxist state, there would be no discussion about a clash of civilizations with the United States; for a Marxist, the struggle is between classes, not nations. China is not a Marxist state, however; its effective ideology is Chinese exceptionalism. That means the question of a clash of civilizations makes perfect sense.

The problem with the theory is that other nations which were heavily influenced by Chinese culture–most notably, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan–are American allies. I can’t see how that fact can be reconciled with the notion of some kind of American struggle with a Chinese cultural sphere of influence.

The real issues between America and China pertain to their very different political systems and to China’s drive to dominate its near abroad. In other words, a model based on ideology or foreign policy realism works better than one based on culture to explain the differences between the two countries.

The best way to neuter NIMBYs would be to give them a direct interest in the success of proposed residential developments. Here are two ways that could be done:

1. The land use approval process could be changed to guarantee property owners only the minimum use required by the Constitution. Anything in addition to that would be contingent on an agreement with the neighbors. Planning staff would be used to mediate and facilitate the agreements. They could address anything from the appearance of the new development to capital improvements in the surrounding areas.
2. Local governments could create tax increment benefit districts around each new development. Increased revenues from the developments could be used for improvements to the surrounding communities.

As a young land use lawyer, I can remember reading countless scholarly articles which, based on an implicit premise that increasing housing supply only generates new demand, insisted that residential development hardly ever paid for itself. I thought the premise had the line of causation reversed, and that the conclusion, if true, would mean property taxes would go up and never come down. I was right; the argument was faulty, and today’s housing shortages and soaring prices are the result.

The fact is that residential development, from the perspective of the entire community, is far more positive than negative; it keeps prices and rents down, increases the tax base, and provides large numbers of jobs in construction and elsewhere. The problem, however, is that it also imposes costs on the immediate neighbors: new traffic; construction noise; reduced privacy; and unwelcome aesthetic changes. The character of the neighborhood can change completely. These are very real problems for the neighbors; just dismissing them and calling them NIMBYs is not a solution.

Local governments typically try to bridge the gap between the community good and the neighborhood harm by creating a transparent process and a meaningful opportunity for the surrounding property owners to be heard. In my experience, the results have been mixed, because the ultimate decisions are usually political, and the stronger side wins. In some communities, this means the developers; in others, it is the neighbors. Either way, the outcome is unsatisfactory to someone.

We need a better way to bridge the gap. I will throw out two proposals tomorrow.

The Russians have apparently decided to refocus their efforts in eastern Ukraine, where they have had more success. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the original drive on Kyiv was just a feint, which is both logically absurd and inconsistent with all of the evidence. What should we think of Plan B?

Putin could have annexed most of this property years ago. He didn’t, because he wanted it to stay as a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian state, and because it is an economically depressed area with minimal value to Russia. Even if he prevails and cuts off eastern Ukraine, it will not be much of a consolation prize; as a result of his impatience, the rest of Ukraine will never be his unless he somehow finds the resources to occupy it over fierce, ongoing native resistance. He can no longer have any illusions about that.

The record will show that I took Larry Summers’ side on stimulus payments when it wasn’t cool. I was ultimately reconciled to those payments when it became clear that they were inevitable; I hoped their political value would outweigh their potentially negative impacts on the economy. In the long run, that didn’t work.

That said, I think Summers is wrong when he calls for sharp increases in interest rates to stop inflation, for the following reasons:

1. HE DOESN’T PAY ENOUGH ATTENTION TO CONDITIONS IN THE UK AND THE EU: As I’ve noted before, it is clear that the largest component in our current inflation rate involves skewed consumer priorities and supply chain problems, not excessive government spending, based on what is happening elsewhere.
2. HE DOESN’T ANALYZE THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF INTEREST RATE INCREASES ON INFLATIONARY SECTORS: Making it harder to borrow money isn’t going to decrease food consumption, stop the impacts of the Ukraine war on gas prices, or reduce the demand for housing. It can only “help” by shattering consumer confidence by driving down asset values, which isn’t worth it.
3. HE DOESN’T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT RAISING RATES HAS LESS IMPACT WHEN CONSUMERS ARE SPENDING THEIR EXCESS SAVINGS: The stimulus payments are only a small component of the vastly increased pandemic savings.

I will reiterate: the Fed needs to talk ferociously about inflation to keep expectations under control, but creating a stagflation recession by driving down the markets won’t do much to stop inflation–it will only add more misery to the equation.

This is about personalities, not ideology. You can break them down as follows:

1. COMPLETE NIHILISTS: The system is completely broken, so let’s destroy it, stop worrying about who gets hurt, and see what happens! EXAMPLES: Most of the members of the Freedom Caucus.
2. OPPORTUNISTIC NIHILISTS: If I absolutely have to, I will vote to keep the government functioning and to avoid a default. I would prefer not to in order to appease the counterrevolutionary base. As for any other constructive efforts to legislate, forget it. EXAMPLES: Too numerous to mention.
3. KEEP THE LIGHTS ON: I will always vote to pay our debts and keep the government open, but that’s it if a Democrat is in the White House. EXAMPLE: Mitch McConnell.
4. OCCASIONALLY CONSTRUCTIVE MEMBERS: Every once in a while, I will show an interest in efforts to expand the welfare state, particularly for children. I will also vote for a Democratic judicial nominee some of the time. EXAMPLES: Mitt Romney; Susan Collins.

The key issue I am illustrating here is what the GOP will do with regard to the debt ceiling and government shutdowns if they win the 2022 elections. There is little reason to believe the fourth group will expand. The first group is beyond hope. Will the majority be in the second or third group? TBD.

I read an article a few days ago about the declining level of empathy in America today. Here’s what the factions would say about that:

1. CDs: Empathy is the glue that keeps society functioning as a single organic whole.
2. CLs: Empathy is the enemy of freedom, the ultimate social good, because it tempts people to vote for regulation that only helps losers.
3. PBPs: It’s a dog-eat-dog world, man. Do you really think I should empathize with my competitors, or do unsolicited favors for my customers?
4. Reactionaries: Sure, I have plenty of empathy– but only for real Americans. Anyone who isn’t a conservative white Christian is my enemy, because he wants to crush my culture.

And you wonder why declining empathy is an issue, and why there are so few CDs left in the GOP?