On Trump and MAPA

Trump’s tariff chaos is making me, along with the rest of America, poor again. Do you remember that being any part of his campaign pitch? Me, neither.

A large part of the base will accept immiseration as long as blue America is being treated even worse; for them, leveling down is perfectly acceptable. Another part treats Trump as a cult leader and will believe the promised land is coming even if takes years–decades, even. But PBP voters and a small part of the base are expecting instant gratification. They will be heard from in 2026, assuming that we have a fair election at that point.

On Natalism and an NYT Article

According to an article in today’s NYT, Trump wants a baby boom. His people are discussing a variety of ways to make it happen. Are they likely to succeed?

In my experience, women are likely to have more children when they have plenty of support, the economy is good, and they have reason to feel optimistic. Today, we are looking at a recession and major cuts in social programs, including those that support traditional families. In addition, Trumpian bro culture discourages men from engaging in the rearing of children, which it would view as women’s work. Under those conditions, do you really think women are going to be lining up to have babies, even if the government offers them some financial incentives to do so?

On Populism and the New Pope

I think Francis will go down in history as a man who built bridges to nowhere. He floated trial balloons and encouraged debate but chose to pull back when things started to get out of hand. He was a well-meaning, noble failure.

There are far worse things, as we are learning every day. The big question for the new pope will revolve around his attitude towards right-wing populism. Will he embrace illiberal regimes for their emphasis on traditional moral values and downplay their contempt for social programs, the poor, the environment, and immigrants? Or will he follow the lead of Francis and confront the authoritarians, while continuing to advocate for traditional values?

I don’t know the answer to that. I suspect that even the cardinals don’t at this point.

On China and Channels

According to an article in, I think, Politico, Trump is waiting for Xi to call him directly to make a deal, but Xi won’t bite. Why not?

For several reasons. First, Xi depends on the support of nationalists at home, so he doesn’t want to make the first move, particularly when it is obvious that Trump is trying to bully him. Second, as the article notes, Xi doesn’t want to be part of an unscripted scene similar to the Zelensky episode. But most importantly, in spite of what Trump probably thinks, Xi is not Putin or Kim; he is the head of a bureaucratic state with a fixed ideology, not an omnipotent fascist leader who can change positions on a dime. As I’ve noted before, Xi is bound by Xi Jinping thought; Putin, like Trump, can reverse himself any time he likes.

My guess is that Trump wants to deal directly with Xi, as he did with Kim, because he wants to discuss an uncomfortably broad geopolitical deal that may even include spheres of influence. Xi and the bureaucracy don’t want any part of that kind of surprise, just as the Soviet and American establishments didn’t embrace Reagan’s impromptu nuclear proposal to Gorbachev in the 1980s.

An American Cultural Revolution?

Thomas Friedman says his Chinese friends see an analogy between Trump and Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Does the analogy hold water?

Yes, because both movements were driven by the man at the top, and in each case, the target was the political and intellectual establishment. But there are differences, too. Mao was relying primarily on non-state actors (the Red Guards) and physical violence to get his way; Trump is using the federal government itself and threats of aid cutoffs to assert his dominance.

The biggest difference is that Mao didn’t have to worry about resistance from the judicial system. Whether that will matter in America in the long run remains to be seen.

On Americans and Religion

Surveys indicate that Americans haven’t given up on religion, but support for organized religion is very limited, particularly among young people. Why?

I think there are three reasons. First, religion was for centuries the principal source of color in a grim, monochromatic workday world; today, everyone has an endless source of entertainment in his pocket. Second, Americans find religious rituals with origins in the distant past to be too lame and remote from their experience in the modern world. Third, Christianity is closely associated with angry Trump voters seeking revenge on the rest of America. Who wants to spend Sunday with people like that?

On a Tariff Silver Lining

As I noted many times during the campaign and thereafter, Trump voters were divided into two groups: reactionaries embraced his authoritarianism, his tariffs, and his plans to wreck America as we knew it; while business interests and moderates predicted confidently that Trump’s promises were lies, and the new administration would look like the old one. We would bring back the economy of 2019 without threatening the system. Happy days were here again.

One of those groups was bound to be disappointed; it didn’t take long to find out which one. For once, Trump told the truth, just as I predicted. The reactionaries are thrilled; business interests, not so much. Now what?

I don’t see any evidence that Trump’s unconstitutional efforts to amass power and impose his will on America are unpopular with Trump voters as a whole. The tariffs, on the other hand, are hated by business, and they may lose support with the base, as well. If American liberal democracy survives, it may well be due, not to public support for the Constitution, but to the price of foreign consumer goods.

What Blue Can Do

Apart from the filibuster and some limited ability to create publicity, the Democrats have no power in Washington. The judiciary has no resources on its own to enforce the law and the Constitution as written. Trump ignores small demonstrations, and massive ones might invite a military response. What can the blue team actually do to protect liberal democracy under these circumstances?

Trump voters don’t appear to have any concerns about his lawlessness, but they do care about their pocketbooks. The Trump economy, including the red states, depends on blue spending. In all likelihood, a recession is on the way. Do what comes naturally and cut back; in particular, don’t buy anything from any company that is closely associated with the Trump agenda. Then sit back and watch Trump’s polling numbers collapse. He may not care, but his GOP enablers will.

The World in Trump’s Dreams

Trump is in the Oval Office when Xi Jinping enters, looking for all the world like a pathetic character from a Dickens novel, on his hands and knees.

XI: Please, Sir.

DT: Oh, it’s you. I’ve been expecting you.

XI: A word, Sir?

DT: What is it, Chinaman? I haven’t got all day. “Fox and Friends” is on in a few minutes.

XI: It’s about the tariffs, Sir.

DT: Of course it is. That’s why I imposed them. What do you want?

XI: (Crawling closer to the Resolute Desk) Please lift them, Sir. I’ll do whatever you want.

DT: It’s about time.

XI: You were right, Sir. You’re always right. And you’re the boss. I know that now.

DT: Damn right I’m the boss.

XI: I’ll do whatever you say, Sir. I’ll kiss your feet.

DT: Prove it. (Xi kisses his foot)

DT: That’s more like it. Now go away. Maybe I’ll lift the tariffs, and maybe I won’t. We’ll see. (Xi leaves)

And then Trump wakes up and finds out that none of this is true.

On Murkowski’s Fears

The biggest nightmare for most GOP members of Congress is a primary opponent supported by Donald Trump. But Lisa Murkowski has already been through that, and she prevailed. So when she talks about her fears, what does she mean?

The answer is obvious–she’s worried about unbounded autocracy enabled by a spineless Congress and unchecked by an ultimately powerless legal system. She has reason.

On Mercantilism, Then and Now

Back in the 17th century, the heyday of mercantilism, most European nations had absolute monarchies, and even those that didn’t granted monopolies on foreign trade to wealthy, well-connected companies that were effectively arms of the state. Under those conditions, mercantilism makes sense. If you don’t believe me, ask Xi Jinping.

But America and its allies–to the extent it still has any–don’t meet those standards. In liberal democracies, individuals, not the state, are the primary economic actors; the state has no economic interests separate from those of their citizens. As a result, mercantilism for us makes no sense whatsoever.

To put it another way, when Trump says America is getting rich because it is taking in millions in tariffs, what good does that do for you? How does it possibly benefit you if American tax money is going into a federal government fund that won’t be spent on you?

On Tariffs and Inflation Expectations

The Trump economic team says that tariffs are a one-off price increase, and will not result in longer-term inflation. Are they right?

As I’ve noted before, tariffs don’t just impact imported goods; they provide an opportunity for domestic competitors to raise their prices in order to increase profits. In addition, it is unlikely that workers will suffer a loss in purchasing power without demanding higher wages. Third, there is no guarantee that any particular level of tariffs will remain stable, given Trump’s penchant for lashing out at anyone who displeases him. Finally, the public is more sensitive to inflation after the experience during the pandemic than it was a few years ago. Surveys indicate that inflation expectations are already high. As a result, the Trump team is probably wrong about the implications of the tariffs.

Of course, if the tariffs drive us into a recession, millions of unemployed workers will be in no position to demand higher wages. That’s the “optimistic” view of inflation.

On “Friendshoring” and “America First”

The latest theory I have read regarding Trump’s chaotic tariff tactics is that the rest of the world, once suitably browbeaten into mutually beneficial agreements, will then ally itself with us against China. Does the theory make sense, and can it succeed?

The central tenets of “‘America First” are that: America has interests, but no friends; the point of negotiations is to dominate your adversary, not to reach agreements that benefit both sides; and the objective of the trade war is to bring manufacturing jobs back to the US and eliminate bilateral trade deficits, not just to contain China and protect vital supply chains. None of this is consistent with “friendshoring,” which assumes that trade deficits will continue, but with friendly countries instead of China.

What the commentators are suggesting is the accomplishment of Biden’s ends of flexible containment and “friendshoring” through Trumpian bullying. It cannot work, and it probably won’t be tried.

On Trump’s Tropical Gulag

Trump is now openly musing about sending convicted criminals who are American citizens to El Salvador. This should set off alarm bells, because if he’s willing to do something that blatantly unconstitutional, it would be a relatively small step to use El Salvador as a pen for political prisoners on the pretext of some sort of bogus “emergency.”

On Tariffs, DeSantis, and the Succession

In spite of his periodic attempts to sound Trumpier-than-thou, Ron DeSantis looks like a dead man walking. The Florida Legislature doesn’t listen to him anymore, and he has nowhere to go after his term expires in 2026. If his wife runs against Trump’s chosen candidate for governor, that is likely to alienate the base even more. Things are looking pretty grim.

But Trump’s tariffs may have thrown him a lifeline. DeSantis has been very vocal about wokeness, but he hasn’t said much about protectionism. That gives him an opening if the tariffs prove to be unpopular; he can continue to beat the drum on wokeness while tying J.D. to the tariffs. It isn’t likely to work, given the doubts the base has about him, but it’s not nothing.