The Chinese Challenge: The Obama Years

Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush clearly thought that integrating China in a web of international commercial relationships would result in a country that was more prosperous, friendly, and democratic. They were right beyond their wildest imagination on the prosperity part, but completely wrong on the other two. It is clear that China has not evolved into a larger version of Japan or South Korea, and there is no reason to believe it will ever happen.

Barack Obama was warier of China when he took office, but he needed Chinese help in dealing with issues like climate change and North Korea, and he appreciated the role the Chinese played in fighting the Great Recession. Preoccupied with other crises, he repeatedly asserted America’s interest in, among other things, protecting intellectual property and freedom of navigation, but he took little effective action to change the behavior of the regime, which consequently became increasingly assertive.

Obama’s ultimate response was the “pivot to Asia,” which included military, diplomatic, and trade components. He moved a few troops to Australia, improved our relationship with India, and, above all, negotiated the TPP, whose significance was primarily geopolitical, not economic. The overall message to the Chinese was that the US would not attempt to halt China’s rise, but would create conditions on the ground that would deter Chinese aggression towards American allies in its near abroad. It was encirclement in embryo; whether the Chinese resisted or accepted the rules of the game was up to them.

Would it have worked? We will never know, because Trump has torn up the script and taken a completely different approach. More on that tomorrow.