We reconvene to discuss foreign policy.
C: OK, we’re back, and I’m going to ask some questions about foreign policy.
O: Shoot.
C: Let’s start with a country that has been in the news a bit lately–Russia.
O: I’ve heard something about that.
C: I did a post about what Putin wants. What do you think he wants?
O: Three things. First and foremost, to stay in power. Second, to dominate his near abroad, and to recreate the Russian Empire to the maximum extent possible. Third, respect for Russia as a world power, and an equal partner of the US.
C: With that in mind, why do you think the “reset” failed?
O: You need to keep in mind that we didn’t really have great expectations for the reset–we just wanted to get his cooperation on a few things that mattered. And it did work, to some extent; it would have been impossible to get the Iran sanctions without his help.
That said, I think it was mostly Ukraine and the Arab Spring that made things go south. Rightly or wrongly, and I would say mostly wrongly, he blamed us for bringing more instability into the world, just as we had with Iraq and the color revolutions. Ukraine in particular hit too close to home. He thought he had to do something, and he did.
C: Do you think you were forceful enough in your response to Crimea and Ukraine?
O: In retrospect, yes. He knew, and we knew, and everyone knew, the United States wasn’t going to war with Russia to save Ukraine. He wanted it more than we did. We made him pay a big price without escalating to the point of making everything much worse. I have no regrets about that.
C: What about Libya?
O: I do have regrets about Libya. There were some good reasons to get involved there, but I shouldn’t have let myself get talked into it without asking more questions. I had too much faith in our allies’ ability and willingness to fix military and political problems without our involvement. I don’t know that I would have done anything differently, but I certainly would have asked more questions before we acted.
C: Do you have anything to say about Benghazi?
O: Hillary responded to all of that very clearly. I don’t have anything to add to what she said.
C: Are the Libyan people, and the world as a whole, better off today without Qaddafi?
O: It’s appalling to have to say this, but I would have to say no. Sometimes revolutions just make everything worse.
C: How do you think that story ends?
O: The story never really ends. I honestly don’t know.
C: Let’s talk about China. I suspect most people would say the “pivot to Asia” was too little, too late. Would you agree?
O: Yes and no. We didn’t get to it until late in my administration due to other pressing problems. But the keystone to it was the TPP, which was more of a geopolitical thing than a free trade agreement. It would have worked to both restrain China and encourage the Chinese government to behave more responsibly. Unfortunately, Trump has torn it up. The other parties have implemented it without us, and still want us to join. Maybe we will when Trump is gone.
C: Do you think you were forceful enough in your response to the fill islands?
O: The fill islands aren’t as big a deal as they are made out to be. They’re sitting ducks in wartime. We made our point by not recognizing Chinese sovereignty over them, but they weren’t important enough to risk war.
C: Is dealing with China the great foreign policy conundrum of the 21st century?
O: Without a doubt, yes.
C: In the long run, can a horrible war be avoided?
O: If the issue is handled properly, yes. The best way is to create a rules-based system that has the support of the Chinese. Will that happen? I don’t know.
C: Let’s move to the Middle East.
O: It had to happen sooner or later.
C: How would you grade yourself on Iraq and IS?
O: It was a mixed bag. I reject the criticism that we should have kept troops in Iraq, and that we could have somehow used our troops as leverage against the bad decisions and corruption of the Maliki government. We wanted to stay in Iraq, but the government would only permit us to remain under terms that would have been completely unacceptable to anyone, Trump included, so we made a virtue of necessity and left. And anyone who thinks that the mere presence of a few thousand American troops would have forced Maliki to be nicer to the Sunnis and less corrupt doesn’t know anything about him.
I think the criticism that we didn’t recognize the IS threat early enough is valid. That said, we put together an approach to win the war, and it worked. I’m proud of that.
C: On a related note, I suspect a lot of people would say that you never really appreciated the fear that Americans had of IS. You kept telling us that deaths from furniture exceeded deaths from terrorism. Do you have any regrets about that?
O: Some. The message I was trying to send was that in countries like Israel and the UK that are accustomed to dealing with terrorism, the people just get on with it. You have to do what you can to get rid of it, but there are so many things you can’t control, so just treat it as a very small part of your life and move on. Americans weren’t ready for that message. I guess I didn’t find the right way to say it. I do regret that.
C: I have argued that your mistake in Syria was in setting the red line, not in refusing to enforce it. Do you agree?
O: Basically, yes. To the extent that I gave any real thought to the red line, I figured that Assad would just respect it, and I would never have to act. That was a mistake. But rejecting the advice of the blob and refusing to launch some sort of pinprick attack was one of the best things I did. Has Trump enhanced American credibility with his pinprick attacks? I don’t think so.
C: I suspect you view the now defunct Iran deal as one of your great accomplishments. Do you agree?
O: Absolutely. First of all, it was really hard work getting everyone, including the Russians and Chinese, to support the sanctions. Then we had to reach an agreement that would work for everyone. We did. Trump and Israel are enjoying the benefits of it, even though they won’t acknowledge that.
C: It appeared to the world that you were tilting away from our traditional support of Saudi Arabia towards a more transactional relationship with both Iran and the Saudis. Do you agree?
O: America’s support of Saudi Arabia has always been based on interests, not shared values. Once the Saudis stopped being the swing oil producer, we had more freedom to be transactional. That was a good thing, particularly since the current Saudi government has become increasingly aggressive in its foreign policy. I had no desire to make America the tip of the Saudi spear. They resented that.
I know there is a lot of hostility, based on history, between Iran and the US. In the long run, I would hope the two countries would get over it and move on. The nuclear deal wasn’t premised on that, but it accommodated it.
C: We’ll conclude with a few questions about Trump. Some people have argued that there is a basic continuity between your foreign policy and his. Do you agree with that?
O: God, no. In the long run, I believe the best protection for America is not just its economy and armed forces, but a fair rules-based international system. The trick is to get the other major powers to buy into that. I think we were making progress with that with the TPP, but Trump blew it up. His bottom line is that he only believes in power, not rules. That’s fine as long as you’re the uncontested world leader. If you ever reach the point when you’re not, there will be no one out there to help you.
C: Both you and Trump were willing to ignore the advice of the blob and talk to unfriendly world leaders. Would you say that is a basic similarity?
O: Yes and no. I’m not in any way critical of his willingness to talk to Kim, or even to the Iranian leadership. I do have a problem with his lack of preparation and his belief that he’s so smart and charming, he can make difficult problems go away. Diplomacy doesn’t work that way.
C: Do you think we’re headed for war with either North Korea or Iran?
O: With North Korea, no. Trump’s heart doesn’t seem to be in it. With Iran, yes. MBS and Netanyahu are determined to push us into war, and economic sanctions aren’t going to force the regime to change its behavior, so where else can he go?
C: Thank you for your time.