Month: April 2022

The Russians have apparently decided to refocus their efforts in eastern Ukraine, where they have had more success. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the original drive on Kyiv was just a feint, which is both logically absurd and inconsistent with all of the evidence. What should we think of Plan B?

Putin could have annexed most of this property years ago. He didn’t, because he wanted it to stay as a Trojan horse within the Ukrainian state, and because it is an economically depressed area with minimal value to Russia. Even if he prevails and cuts off eastern Ukraine, it will not be much of a consolation prize; as a result of his impatience, the rest of Ukraine will never be his unless he somehow finds the resources to occupy it over fierce, ongoing native resistance. He can no longer have any illusions about that.

The record will show that I took Larry Summers’ side on stimulus payments when it wasn’t cool. I was ultimately reconciled to those payments when it became clear that they were inevitable; I hoped their political value would outweigh their potentially negative impacts on the economy. In the long run, that didn’t work.

That said, I think Summers is wrong when he calls for sharp increases in interest rates to stop inflation, for the following reasons:

1. HE DOESN’T PAY ENOUGH ATTENTION TO CONDITIONS IN THE UK AND THE EU: As I’ve noted before, it is clear that the largest component in our current inflation rate involves skewed consumer priorities and supply chain problems, not excessive government spending, based on what is happening elsewhere.
2. HE DOESN’T ANALYZE THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF INTEREST RATE INCREASES ON INFLATIONARY SECTORS: Making it harder to borrow money isn’t going to decrease food consumption, stop the impacts of the Ukraine war on gas prices, or reduce the demand for housing. It can only “help” by shattering consumer confidence by driving down asset values, which isn’t worth it.
3. HE DOESN’T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT RAISING RATES HAS LESS IMPACT WHEN CONSUMERS ARE SPENDING THEIR EXCESS SAVINGS: The stimulus payments are only a small component of the vastly increased pandemic savings.

I will reiterate: the Fed needs to talk ferociously about inflation to keep expectations under control, but creating a stagflation recession by driving down the markets won’t do much to stop inflation–it will only add more misery to the equation.

This is about personalities, not ideology. You can break them down as follows:

1. COMPLETE NIHILISTS: The system is completely broken, so let’s destroy it, stop worrying about who gets hurt, and see what happens! EXAMPLES: Most of the members of the Freedom Caucus.
2. OPPORTUNISTIC NIHILISTS: If I absolutely have to, I will vote to keep the government functioning and to avoid a default. I would prefer not to in order to appease the counterrevolutionary base. As for any other constructive efforts to legislate, forget it. EXAMPLES: Too numerous to mention.
3. KEEP THE LIGHTS ON: I will always vote to pay our debts and keep the government open, but that’s it if a Democrat is in the White House. EXAMPLE: Mitch McConnell.
4. OCCASIONALLY CONSTRUCTIVE MEMBERS: Every once in a while, I will show an interest in efforts to expand the welfare state, particularly for children. I will also vote for a Democratic judicial nominee some of the time. EXAMPLES: Mitt Romney; Susan Collins.

The key issue I am illustrating here is what the GOP will do with regard to the debt ceiling and government shutdowns if they win the 2022 elections. There is little reason to believe the fourth group will expand. The first group is beyond hope. Will the majority be in the second or third group? TBD.

I read an article a few days ago about the declining level of empathy in America today. Here’s what the factions would say about that:

1. CDs: Empathy is the glue that keeps society functioning as a single organic whole.
2. CLs: Empathy is the enemy of freedom, the ultimate social good, because it tempts people to vote for regulation that only helps losers.
3. PBPs: It’s a dog-eat-dog world, man. Do you really think I should empathize with my competitors, or do unsolicited favors for my customers?
4. Reactionaries: Sure, I have plenty of empathy– but only for real Americans. Anyone who isn’t a conservative white Christian is my enemy, because he wants to crush my culture.

And you wonder why declining empathy is an issue, and why there are so few CDs left in the GOP?

Being an illiberal country isn’t necessary incompatible with NATO membership–just ask the Poles. NATO members, however, have an obligation to follow the NATO line with regard to Russia. If they cannot be trusted in a time of conflict, they shouldn’t be part of the alliance.

Erdogan has already made it clear that he wants the benefits of membership without its obligations. That means he might even pass NATO military secrets on to Putin in the event of a conflict. Orban’s Hungary appears to be moving in the same direction.

We should not tolerate potential Trojan horses within the alliance. Erdogan and Orban should be told to shape up or face the bear without our assistance.

Advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have helped the Ukrainians stop the Russian advance, but the Ukrainians won’t be able to mount large scale counteroffensives to throw the Russians back without weapons designed for that purpose. As a result, Zelensky quite reasonably is asking for tanks and planes. Should he get them?

We are walking a tightrope here. On the one hand, the most desirable outcome of the war–the complete expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine–is impossible unless we give Zelensky what he wants. On the other hand, giving him offensive weapons may cause the Russians to escalate, with possible catastrophic results. The red line is in Putin’s mind, not on paper. It’s a tough call.

Since it is highly unlikely that Ukraine would ever launch a ground assault on Russian territory, my best guess is that tanks wouldn’t cross the line. Fighters and bombers would worry me more. If I were Biden, I would split the difference.

I first met Vladimir Putin years ago, when he was just a struggling KGB agent in Dresden. He tried (unsuccessfully, of course) to make me a KGB asset, but not very hard; you could tell his heart wasn’t in it. He came across as someone who loved his country, but had some doubts about communism. We hit it off immediately over a few warm East German beers. He promised to keep in touch.

When I saw him the next time, he was, much to his surprise (and mine), President of Russia. He had just obliterated Chechnya, but did not have any apparent issues with the US or NATO. He was basically the same guy, but he had developed some attitudes about power and the manifest destiny of Russia that made me queasy. At times, his comments about the Russian people sounded like something that would come out of the mouth of an 18th century tsar. I was a bit worried about what it meant for the future, but I let it go.

The next time I saw him, he had just taken Crimea. He was riding high. He kept spouting nonsense about the holiness of Russia and how America had screwed up the world. I couldn’t get him to stop. I couldn’t decide whether he actually bought into this stuff or not, but it didn’t matter. We didn’t have anything more to say. I haven’t seen him since.

Today, he looks and sounds like a monster. I don’t even recognize him. He’s just not the same guy. He needs to go as soon as possible.

According to the NYT, the CCP is preparing a film for the viewing of party members that portrays Putin as the proper successor of Stalin, following a line of foolish wimps. To the CCP (but probably few others), this is a compliment. What does it tell us about the CCP?

It no longer takes communism seriously as an economic theory. To the CCP, “communism” is a form of national renewal in the face of global opposition through an authoritarian government; it has nothing to do with the ultimate success of the working class in a class struggle driven by dialectical materialism. In that sense, Putin’s fascist Russia is becoming as “communist” as China. Finally, it suggests that the CCP is turning into a one-man operation. It no longer has any time for collective leadership.

Of course, this sounds like a rationale for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and we know how that turned out.

We saw the kind of deplorable tactics Putin is using in Ukraine in Syria and Chechnya, too. The American public didn’t display the same level of interest or disgust during the earlier conflicts. Why the difference?

There are several reasons. First, the magnitude of the invasion of Ukraine is much larger. Second, the Russian military had a legal right to be in Chechnya and Syria, while Ukraine is an invasion and a violation of international law, pure and simple. Third, the victims of the previous acts of aggression had far less access to the Western mass media than the Ukrainians. Finally, and I suspect most importantly, Ukraine and its residents are closer to us than the residents of Syria and Chechnya. We can now imagine Russia attacking NATO countries, and we can relate culturally to the Ukrainian population.

You can argue, and some have, that the last item is racist. I think it is just natural for us to care more about our neighbors than the people on the other side the world. I don’t think we need to apologize for it.

Citing the examples of several international evildoers, Ross Douthat argues that keeping sanctions on Russia after a short period will only solidify Putin’s control of the populace. Is he right?

Yes. The situation is even worse than he suggests; the longer the sanctions stay on, the more ability the Russians have to counter them, and make them useless in the future. That’s why I’ve maintained that sanctions need to come off as part of any agreement; to leave them on purely for the emotional satisfaction of the American public will only damage our interests in the long run.

Given the spirit of the age, you might think that World War I was an imperialist war, but it wasn’t. The Austrians wanted war to fix an intractable political problem at home; the Tsar was afraid his government would fall if it backed down; the Germans were afraid of the “Russian steamroller;” the French were afraid of fighting at some future date without Russian help; and the British were afraid of a continent dominated by Germany. There are no territorial claims in that list.

Given the bloodshed that ensued over the next few years, and given that there were no real ideological stakes in the conflict, you would think that stalemate would lead to a reasonable negotiated peace. It didn’t happen, due to “Dateline” syndrome. All of the parties concluded that, in light of the magnitude of their losses, they needed a clear victory and territorial gains in order to justify the war. The bad guys had to be identified and punished, and the good guys had to be rewarded. And so the war went on, with catastrophic results for Europe and the entire world.

That is my fear for Ukraine. We need to avoid the temptation of “Dateline” syndrome. A deal may not look great (as with, for example, the Korean War), but the alternatives are impractical and dangerous.