It appears that the new Russian offensive is directed at Ukraine’s Black Sea coast as well as the Donbas. Does that make sense?
Yes. While expanding the Rust Belt breakaway republics does little or nothing for Russia, taking the coastline would have a major impact on Ukraine’s economy and would increase Putin’s negotiating leverage. Don’t be surprised if a battle for Odesa becomes the turning point in the war.
Ross Douthat cites survey results which indicate that a far greater proportion of Gen Z members identify as LGBTQ than their parents or grandparents. He divides public opinion on this issue into three groups: one that celebrates this development; one that deplores it; and one that thinks the issue will resolve itself appropriately in time. He wants the last group to join with the second group in supporting measures such as Florida’s “Don’t Say Gay” bill, but fears that the power of PC will prevent them from speaking out.
Here are my thoughts on the issue:
A note to my readers: I will be out of town until April 23. Regular posts will resume the following day.
So the war rumbles on in Ukraine.
It’s looking a little like Spain.
Volunteers rushing in;
Both sides desperate to win;
And the world sorely misses the grain.
We have seen a rash of articles and columns proclaiming that Ukraine means the end of the latest round of globalization, much as Sarajevo meant the end of the last round. Is that accurate?
Yes and no, but mostly no. Globalization has been in retreat for about a decade. The Brexit vote, the Trump victory in 2016, the Trump tariffs, and the international response to the pandemic all indicate that globalization has been on the back foot for years. America and China are both determined to decouple from each other, although the process is likely to be slow and nuanced. Ukraine is just another stone on a pretty well-defined path.
That said, the effects of the last round of globalization will not be overturned completely. American companies may diversify their supply chains, particularly with regard to goods with clear relationships to national security, but they aren’t going to withdraw from China altogether. Consumers here and elsewhere aren’t going to want to give up the benefits of low prices for goods. The forces supporting the status quo are stronger than you might think.
In short, don’t hold your breath waiting for the textile mills in South Carolina to reopen because Putin invaded Ukraine. It isn’t going to happen. Those jobs are gone for good–and, to a lesser extent, for ill.
We have seen over the last few days that the concept of a “clash of civilizations” doesn’t really describe the current geopolitical reality very accurately. The major chord is good old-fashioned great power rivalry, as applied to a multi-polar world; the minor chord is a dispute between authoritarian and liberal government.
You can analogize, without undue difficulty, today’s world to Europe in 1914. China is Imperial Germany–growing rapidly, nationalistic, full of energy and ideas, and desperately looking for respect from its rivals; America is the UK–still the most powerful nation, but with its primacy under threat; the EU is France, in relative decline; and Russia is, well, the Russian Empire-a creepy, imperialist autocracy. The analogy isn’t perfect; ideological differences were less prominent then than they are now, as evidenced by the fact that Nicholas II was related to the British royal family (hence, his son’s hemophilia). It does work, however.
What does that mean for American foreign policy? It means that we are going to have to tolerate cooperating with some very imperfect nations in our quest to keep the revisionist autocratic countries from imposing their rules on the rest of us. That will be awkward at times, but it can be done. We did it every day during the Cold War.
The old Cold War saying was that “Europe was from Venus, and America is from Mars.” Europe promoted liberal democracy through trade, expanding the EU, promoting human rights, and making rules; America, on the other hand, was more likely to use force to accomplish its objectives. Macron has talked at great length about European “sovereignty.” Do we have fuel here for a kind of clash of civilizations?
No. America has become less enamored of using force after Iraq, and the two protagonists have responded in similar fashion to Ukraine. In addition, there are “red” right-wing populist states in Europe as well as in America. Not only do the two parties agree on most of the essentials; they have the same kinds of internal disputes about identity politics. Any distance between the two is consequently based on the logic of interests and foreign policy realism, not culture.
Whether you like him or not, you have to admit that Macron practically oozes intelligence and competence. The record backs him up, too; the French economy is doing well, and unemployment is way down, in spite of the recession.
Notwithstanding the good news, there is a real chance that he could lose the election to a counterrevolutionary populist. The message to Democrats is simple, but scary: delivering the material goods isn’t enough. You have to figure out a way to get the identity politics right, too.
It is fair to assume that a President Le Pen, lacking the legal ability to withdraw from the EU, will follow the Polish and Hungarian playbook and try to render it powerless from within. Given the importance of France to the EU, she could succeed. What then?
Remember, the EU and NATO were created largely to keep the Germans under control. If the two organizations are effectively neutered, the Germans–now more economically and politically dominant in Europe than ever–will have some important decisions to make. One can imagine them developing nuclear weapons and becoming more diplomatically aggressive in order to fill the new security vacuum. Would that outcome be welcomed by the French?
France, be careful what you ask for, because you might get it.
As the saying goes, Islamic extremists hate us as much for who we are as for what we do. They despise our culture. As a result, it makes perfect sense to talk about a clash of civilizations as it pertains to them.
But they don’t count for much after the destruction of ISIS. Iran isn’t really a revolutionary state anymore, and its appeal is limited to Shiite Muslims. Afghanistan is a basket case; it is debatable whether its leaders have much interest in spreading the word outside its boundaries in any event. The principal Islamic states dislike jihadis as much as we do. There just isn’t much fuel available for an international culture war between Christians and Muslims; the more prominent dispute is the centuries-old internal battle between Sunnis and Shiites.
Once again, the clash of civilizations thesis fails the reality test.
Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has been ambivalent about its relationship with the rest of Europe. On the one hand, you have heads of state who viewed Russia as being a backward cousin needing a substantial amount of modernizing; on the other, you have Russian leaders who purported to believe that their country was, and should remain, unique and uncorrupted by the West. Peter, Catherine the Great, Lenin, and Gorbachev were in the first group; Nicholas II and Stalin were in the second.
Putin is advertising himself as a member of the second group. Whether he actually believes his reactionary nationalist drivel is almost beside the point now. The bottom line is that his war with Ukraine–the Abel to Russia’s Cain–can hardly be described as a clash of civilizations; furthermore, Putin has friends among Catholics (the Hungarians) and Muslims (Syria). His ambition to recreate the Russian Empire consequently has no connection with culture wars; it is just old-fashioned imperialism, pure and simple.
This one should be a no-brainer. The French economy is in relatively good shape, particularly in light of the pandemic. Putin is an ally of Le Pen. What more do you need to know?
The problem is that populism is alive and well in France for the same reasons that it is here: animosity among residents of rural areas and decaying 19th century industrial areas towards more affluent knowledge workers and immigrants. In addition to that, Macron frequently comes across as being detached and indifferent. Jupiter didn’t have to present himself for re-election, but Macron does; he appears to forget that at times.
A Le Pen victory would be a disaster for France, the EU, and NATO, but a huge win for Putin. Let’s hope with all of our might that it doesn’t happen.
I’ve got those dirty, lowdown, Ukraine battle blues.
You have to be aware of it; it’s all over the news.
The invasion isn’t going well, and now I’ve got to choose.
If things don’t start improving soon, I’m surely going to lose.
__________________
Should I escalate the war, or should I just refrain?
Should I focus on the east, and really bring the pain?
Attacking NATO is a risk; would it be worth the gain?
One thing that I know for sure–I’m going to take the blame.
________________
I’ve got the blues.
The stuck in Ukraine blues.
I got a lot of bad advice
For that, there’s no excuse.
It’s time to change the narrative
So I can say I won.
I have to have a victory
When all is said and done.
If China were a truly Marxist state, there would be no discussion about a clash of civilizations with the United States; for a Marxist, the struggle is between classes, not nations. China is not a Marxist state, however; its effective ideology is Chinese exceptionalism. That means the question of a clash of civilizations makes perfect sense.
The problem with the theory is that other nations which were heavily influenced by Chinese culture–most notably, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan–are American allies. I can’t see how that fact can be reconciled with the notion of some kind of American struggle with a Chinese cultural sphere of influence.
The real issues between America and China pertain to their very different political systems and to China’s drive to dominate its near abroad. In other words, a model based on ideology or foreign policy realism works better than one based on culture to explain the differences between the two countries.
The best way to neuter NIMBYs would be to give them a direct interest in the success of proposed residential developments. Here are two ways that could be done:
As a young land use lawyer, I can remember reading countless scholarly articles which, based on an implicit premise that increasing housing supply only generates new demand, insisted that residential development hardly ever paid for itself. I thought the premise had the line of causation reversed, and that the conclusion, if true, would mean property taxes would go up and never come down. I was right; the argument was faulty, and today’s housing shortages and soaring prices are the result.
The fact is that residential development, from the perspective of the entire community, is far more positive than negative; it keeps prices and rents down, increases the tax base, and provides large numbers of jobs in construction and elsewhere. The problem, however, is that it also imposes costs on the immediate neighbors: new traffic; construction noise; reduced privacy; and unwelcome aesthetic changes. The character of the neighborhood can change completely. These are very real problems for the neighbors; just dismissing them and calling them NIMBYs is not a solution.
Local governments typically try to bridge the gap between the community good and the neighborhood harm by creating a transparent process and a meaningful opportunity for the surrounding property owners to be heard. In my experience, the results have been mixed, because the ultimate decisions are usually political, and the stronger side wins. In some communities, this means the developers; in others, it is the neighbors. Either way, the outcome is unsatisfactory to someone.
We need a better way to bridge the gap. I will throw out two proposals tomorrow.