Month: December 2021

(It’s 5:00 on December 24. Bob Cratchit is working in his cubicle at Scrooge, LLC when the boss, in “managing by walking around” mode, comes by.)

C: Mr. Scrooge, sir.

S: What is it . . . (looks at the nameplate on the cubicle) . . . Cratchit?

C: Can I have tomorrow off, sir?

S: Why in the world would I do that?

C: Why . . . because it’s Christmas, sir.

S: Not in China, it isn’t. How am I supposed to compete with those people and their low labor costs if I give you unnecessary days off?

C: Well, actually, the Chinese get a whole week off for Chinese New Year. We never should have come back to the office, anyway. The new variant is running wild, and I might get sick and give it to my child. He has special needs, you know.

S: (Sees a picture of Tiny Tim in the cubicle) Is that him?

C: Yes, sir.

(Scrooge walks around the office with an exaggerated limp)

C: There’s nothing funny about it, sir! He’s in really bad shape! If he gets the virus, it could kill him!

S: I don’t have time for that political correctness crap.

C: You sound just like Donald Trump, sir.

S: Trump is right about some things. Sometimes, I miss him.

C: Surely, you didn’t approve of the January 6 insurrection.

S: No. That was a bridge too far. It was bad for business. But we need a Republican who will get rid of Trump’s tariffs, while standing up for people like me. We’re the makers, you know. Without us, this country would be nothing, and people like you would be out of a job and begging on the streets.

C: So you really want Mitt Romney? Or Rick Scott?

S: They’re what we really need. Real capitalists–not a bogus one, like Trump.

C: What about DeSantis? He seems to be the flavor of the moment.

S: He spends too much time complaining about wokeness, and not enough about socialism. That’s the real problem in this country. And he spends too much money.

C: Which he got from Biden.

S: Which Biden got from me. We need to get that guy out right away. He wants to raise my taxes and cut my profits. He doesn’t show me the proper respect. And he likes unions way too much. He would probably order me to give you Christmas off.

C: So what about it?

S: I don’t want trouble with the socialists, so I will give you your day off. Sort of. There will be a Zoom meeting at noon. I’ll text you the password.

C: Thank you, sir!

S: And don’t even think about ghosting me!

(Cratchit packs up and leaves)

Angela Merkel tried her best to impose the Teutonic virtues of frugality and hard work on the Greeks, without much success. She showed less enthusiasm for enforcing EU rules regarding liberal democracy on the Hungarians and Poles, and the results speak for themselves. Will her successors handle the issue differently?

Probably. The three coalition parties are going to have limited patience with countries which use German tax money to impose reactionary values. Once again, I think you will see more idealism and less raw pragmatism from the new regime. The unity of the EU will consequently be at greater risk than before.

Germans have been of two minds about Russia since the days of Frederick the Great. One school of thought has it that Russia is a huge, backward, barbarian country that can’t be trusted and can only be held in check through military might; the other is that constructive engagement is the best way to keep the Russians from causing trouble. The list of efforts to engage the Russians is lengthy, and includes Nord Stream 2, Ostpolitik, illicit military cooperation between the two wars, and Bismarck’s Reinsurance Treaty. Oh, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Let’s not forget that one.

Merkel moved closer to the first camp after Crimea, because it proved to her that Putin couldn’t be trusted, but she never lost touch with the second group, as evidenced by her support of Nord Stream 2. What will the new government do? Most likely, it will be more idealistic and less supportive of business, so it will be more consistently tough on Putin than Merkel was, but without offering any kind of additional military deterrent.

Conceptually, Biden has three tools with which to fight climate change: legislation, in the form of a carbon tax and amendments to the Clean Air Act; regulation, based on the existing version of the Clean Air Act; and subsidies. In reality, legislation is hopeless, due to the filibuster, and the Supreme Court can’t wait to invalidate his regulations. Subsidies, as a result, are the centerpiece of his climate strategy. Today, it appears that Joe Manchin, with the assistance of the entire Republican Party, has cut off that leg of the stool, too. Why?

While Manchin is undoubtedly motivated by both short-term financial and political interest, he purports to believe that the transition to a carbon-free economy should be deliberate, and driven by the private sector. He would undoubtedly argue that the decision of the various auto producers to move to electric vehicles over time is evidence that the government need not be involved. But is he right? Will the magic of the marketplace solve climate change?

No, for three reasons:

1. There actually is a plausible market-based approach to climate change. However, it would require Manchin to vote for a carbon tax. Without a price on carbon, producers of carbon dioxide will simply continue to impose their costs on others, because, well, why wouldn’t they? As far as they’re concerned, deaths from weather events are just acceptable collateral damage.
2. And then there is the chicken and egg problem, most obviously seen with electric vehicles. Relatively few people will buy them without a network of chargers in place due to range anxiety, but investors aren’t going to shell out the immense amount of money necessary to create the network until they know the electric vehicles will be on the road. The powers of inertia here, and the special interests supporting the status quo, are incredibly strong. Only the government, realistically speaking, has the resources to break the logjam and make it happen in a reasonable amount of time.
3. The pace of change, left to the private sector, will be far too slow relative to the magnitude of the problem, and the speed with which it is getting worse. Without the resources of the federal government, the carbon-free economy will come too late to avoid the problems we are all dreading.

The bottom line is that, instead of investing a large amount of money in the short run to prevent climate change disasters, we are stumbling into having to pay far greater costs in the long run, in the form of ruined infrastructure, abandoned desert and coastal real estate, less fertile farmland, and unnecessary deaths from hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes. That’s stupid. But it is who and where we are today.

Don’t say I didn’t warn you: I predicted that Manchin would be the more powerful of the two Joes even before the inauguration.

Manchin would probably tell you that the electorate voted against Trump, but only for limited change, in 2020; his actions are consequently consistent with the public mandate. In a narrow, political sense, he is probably right. From a public policy perspective, however, his position is far more difficult to defend.

Manchin argues that: the BBB will cause inflation; the legislation is full of gimmicks that won’t really lower its cost; and that the increase in the budget deficit that will result is unacceptable. On inflation, he is just wrong; the additional annual increase in federal spending is a drop in the bucket, particularly when compared to the withdrawal of stimulus that will occur in the near future. On the budget gimmicks, he is right, but that is Sinema’s fault, not Biden’s; he needs to take that up with her. On the deficit, you can give him credit for being consistent, as he also voted against the Trump tax cuts; however, the legislation includes investments that will reduce the deficit, not increase it, in the long run, and the cost of financing the additional debt will be negligible in real terms as long as interest rates remain low.

If the BBB is truly dead, the worst impacts will be felt with climate change. Manchin appears to believe that the transition to a carbon neutral economy should be fairly slow, and driven by the private sector. Is he right? Tune in tomorrow for a discussion of that topic.

It is fair to describe Macron’s vision for the EU as Gaullism for an entire continent: a powerful third party, with its own values and interests, skating between an unreliable US and a dangerous China. Merkel didn’t buy into the vision. What about the new German government?

Let’s put it this way–the EU cannot be a true world power in its own right without detaching itself from the US in NATO and creating its own viable, independent military capability. That would involve massive increases in defense spending in Germany and throughout the EU. The Free Democrats aren’t going to be interested in spending increases of any sort; the SPD and the Greens will want to spend any additional money on infrastructure, workers, and the environment, not more men with guns.

In short, the dream is a road to nowhere. The new government may be slightly more accepting of the notion of a transfer union, but that’s it.

It can be hard to remember now, but there was a time about 20 years ago when Germany was viewed as the sick man of Europe. Two developments changed that: first, the labor reforms introduced by the SPD government, which cut costs and made German products more competitive, at the cost of added inequality; and second, the tremendous demand for German products generated by the Chinese. German machine tools and Audis were particularly prized. But what about now?

The commercial and political relationship between Germany and China is changing. The Chinese no longer require German technology; their new objective is to make the Germans their dependents, by purchasing just enough German products to prevent any objections to their views on human rights. Merkel probably was aware of that, but nonetheless emphasized the protection of short-term interests of German exporters instead of standing on principle. Will her successors do the same thing?

I think we will see more idealism and less coddling of exporters from the new government. Neither the SPD nor the Greens will be naturally sympathetic to big business. Relations between the two great exporting nations are going to get a lot rockier.

Putin’s list of demands makes it clear that I was right; the crisis is about building support at home and trying to divide NATO, not Ukraine. That means an invasion is unlikely, if not impossible.

How should NATO respond? With a carefully worded statement which makes it clear that: the current crisis is completely due to a gratuitous Russian buildup at the border; there are no plans in the foreseeable future to include Ukraine in NATO, or to put NATO troops there; but the ultimate decision as to Ukraine’s NATO membership is not in Russia’s hands.

The two have plenty in common: both are effectively independent, democratic states in close proximity to much larger, authoritarian states with a plausible (if hardly uncontested) historical claim to control them. Are the similarities between them greater than the differences?

The latter are: Taiwan, in spite of its unpromising beginnings, is a more impeccably liberal democratic state; Taiwan is the sea gateway to Japan and South Korea, whereas Ukraine has far less strategic significance to the West; and Ukraine is impossible for the West to defend without an all-out war with Russia, due to its lengthy land and sea boundary with Russia, whereas the assumption has always been that America’s air and sea supremacy was enough to protect Taiwan from a Chinese invasion.

In short, the answer is no, but the question is getting closer, due to the increase in Chinese military power. America is never going to go to war with Russia over Ukraine, any more than it went to war with the USSR over Czechoslovakia or Hungary during the Cold War. What will happen with Taiwan is not currently foreseeable.

We are frequently told, mostly by people with vested interests who probably know better, that the poor suffer the most from inflation. The truth, as usual, is more complicated, as follows:

1. People with existing debts tied to fixed interest rates are unquestionably winners, as they get to repay the debt in depreciated currency. Creditors lose, for the same reason.
2. People whose income comes from the government, and who benefit from statutory cost of living increases (i.e., Social Security) break even.
3. Businesses have the legal ability to raise prices, and thus protect their profits, very quickly. Whether they can do so in practice depends on the elasticity of the demand for their product or service and their market power.
4. Workers subject to collective bargaining agreements that do not contemplate inflation, and which expire in the distant future, are losers.
5. Minimum wage workers may win or lose, depending on the state of the labor market. In today’s market, they have the ability to move on for higher pay. That will probably change in the fairly near future.
6. People with large sums of money in long term CDs lose, unless the CDs provide for inflation protection, which is unusual.
7. Investors are dependent on the businesses in which they invest–see #3.

On the specter of rising inflation.

It is causing a public sensation.

The prez and the Fed

Want to kill it stone dead.

Will they work to control expectations?

As anyone who grew up in the 1970s knows, there are both objective and subjective elements of inflation. The objective elements consist of things like supply chain bottlenecks and labor shortages that will undoubtedly be fixed with reasonable efforts over time. The subjective element, which is more important in the long run, revolves around the expectations of the public. Once workers and consumers have concluded that price increases are inevitable, they will adjust their habits accordingly, and only dramatic action, probably resulting in a recession, will break the cycle. What, then, should be done?

The key here is messaging. Both the White House and the Fed need to look tough and determined on inflation without actually doing anything to damage the economy. Making a big deal about ending bond purchases, which are unnecessary at this point, is a good start; since the markets have changed their focus to inflation, this can probably be done without creating a taper tantrum and driving the markets down. Raising interest rates, on the other hand, will not kill the booming demand for goods, which is being driven by savings; it will only restrict investment and choke off supply-based solutions.

Fox News is going to bang on about inflation for self-interested reasons, so the message won’t get through to everyone, but the vast majority of Americans get their information elsewhere. If the optics are handled properly, the problem will disappear.

Once the reactionaries win on abortion, they are going to move on to gay marriage. Will the Supreme Court go along?

It’s a close call. On the one hand, gay marriage is more closely rooted in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment than abortion, the reliance factor (at least in red states) is greater, and the decision has not been as controversial as Roe in the legal profession. On the other hand, there is no legislative history tying the Fourteenth Amendment to gay marriage, which matters to the originalists, and the decision is relatively recent, which makes it logically easier to overturn.

I think you will see increased pressure on the issue, but it won’t bear fruit for at least a few years.

Justice Thomas is angry. He’s been angry since his confirmation hearings. Probably, he was angry even before then. He wants to get even—now.

He will have his chance. Next year, he will join the majority in overturning Roe. He will undoubtedly feel righteous, and vindicated. It is the ultimate way of owning the libs. It is what he has been waiting for all of these years.

The majority opinion in Dobbs will undoubtedly make an effort to soothe the fears of women all over America. It will reassure them that the Supreme Court hears them, and empathizes with their desire for equality–just not where abortion is concerned. Will Thomas play along, or will he spike the football in the face of the left?

I don’t think he will be able to restrain himself. He will write an opinion that will be remembered, and hated, by the left for a long, long time.

We all know that American reactionaries aren’t going to support tax increases to pay the costs of dealing with millions of new unwanted children after Roe. Would it be possible to privatize and equalize those burdens by sticking it to the fathers?

You can see, conceptually, how it might work. Unmarried women who become pregnant would be required to undergo DNA tests as early as possible to establish paternity. That done, the father of the unborn child would be required to pay for all of the medical and social costs of giving birth to the child. He would remain responsible for those costs unless and until the child is adopted. If he doesn’t comply, he goes to jail for contempt of court. Great idea, no?

There are three huge problems with it. First of all, the average father doesn’t have any money, and putting him in jail won’t solve the problem. Second, this system would require significant new public resources for enforcement; reactionaries aren’t going to support that. Finally, most legislators are men. Do you really think they would go along with a scheme like this? Does our experience with child support enforcement give you an answer to that question?

To my readers: I will be on vacation until late Thursday. Don’t count on any new posts until then.