The USSR presented a very serious military and ideological threat to the countries of Western Europe during the Cold War. No reasonable person could look at the regimes of the Warsaw Pact and wonder what his fate would be if the USSR were to move the Iron Curtain to the west. And so, in spite of occasional objections and ambivalence, the US could rely on its NATO allies when push came to shove.
China presents a very different challenge for the EU. It is not a military threat, and it does not seek to overthrow any European government. At worst, it seeks to turn the EU countries into economic dependents, and to stifle any criticism of its political system, its human rights practices, and its foreign policy. As a result, the US can’t expect the same degree of support from its NATO allies that it received during the Cold War.
What does this mean for American foreign policy? That the EU nations will be of very limited assistance in dealing with Chinese military activity in Asia—hence, the Australian submarine deal. We will need help from our Asian friends, not Europe, in confronting those challenges. You can consequently expect America to slowly and quietly pull some of its resources out of NATO, and to turn the responsibilities for dealing with Russian aggression over to the Europeans. Second, the focus of America’s diplomacy with the EU relative to China will be on economic matters of mutual interest, not military issues. Third, the EU is going to do its best, for business reasons, to avoid choosing between China and America. The real point of decision will be on tech issues with national security implications. How will the mop flop here? Only time will tell, but it is likely that the EU will not be united on these matters.