People my age will remember that the leadership of the Soviet Union used to engage in a good cop, bad cop routine revolving around the “hardliners in the Kremlin.” The idea was that the American government should make concessions on this issue or that to strengthen the hand of the existing “moderate” Soviet leaders, because the alternative was far, far worse. In reality, there was little or no daylight between the leadership and the purported hardliners, and the gambit rarely worked.
It occurred to me a few days ago that Kim is faced with the same sort of issue with the current US government. The North Koreans clearly believe that there is a distinction between Trump, who is accommodating and wants to make a deal, and his cabinet members, who are much more skeptical. Are they right?
In some ways, yes. It is true that Trump wants “wins” and the spotlight, and doesn’t care about the specifics of the negotiations. That makes him an easier target for the North Koreans. It is also true that it has been possible on occasion to persuade Trump to overrule his advisers and make concessions to Kim. The problem, however, is that denuclearization is a complex process that inevitably requires lots of hard work and expertise, which in turn means that Trump can’t and won’t do it himself. Mattis, Pompeo, Bolton, and the rest of the hardliner cast have to be involved if anything meaningful is to get done.
Trump himself seems to have declared victory and moved on. The North Koreans are getting frustrated with the lack of progress, even though they have “won” by looking reasonable to the rest of the world. How can they cut through this situation and regain Trump’s attention? By saying or doing something outrageous, of course. It always worked in the past.
It’s going to happen. It’s just a matter of time.