Playing the Russia Card

The demise of the TPP has dealt a severe blow to the effort to construct a rules-based system to either accommodate or deter China, depending on its behavior. Trump thinks rules are for suckers, anyway;  power is all that matters.  In light of that, how, if at all, does he propose to stop Chinese aggression in the South China Sea?

Trump’s principal concern about China is its trade surplus, so it may be safely assumed that he would be willing to swap Chinese predominance in its immediate neighborhood for a better deal on commercial issues.  Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a deal cannot be made, here are his options:

1.  Indifference:  Trump could simply decide that East Asia is a far away place about which we know little, and permit the Chinese to convert it into a sphere of influence.  Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, among others, would become Chinese vassal states.  Call it the Xi Doctrine.

2.  A Show of Force:  Perceiving that time is not on his side, Trump could order an attack on the lightly populated Chinese “islands” early in his administration. The objective would be to send a message of American military predominance without creating too great a risk of escalation.

3.  Encirclement, with Russian Assistance:  As part of a deal in which Putin is given a free hand in the former Soviet Union, Trump could call on the Russians to ratchet up tensions along the Chinese border, thereby relieving some of the pressure in the South China Sea.

Nixon and Kissinger reached out to China in the early 1970’s in order to create leverage with the Soviet Union.  This was known as “playing the China card.”  If Trump were to choose Option #3, he would be doing precisely the opposite.