Cromwell

C: We’re almost a year into Trump 2.0, and less than a year to the midterms. How do you feel about the coming year?

M: Very, very worried.

S: Cautiously optimistic.

C: Mark, why are you so worried?

M: I’ll break it down into economics and politics. On the economic front, Trump brings instability to everything he touches, and so many things could go wrong. The tariffs continue to be a problem. My auto dealership is still selling 2025 models because a 2026 car was subject to tariffs and has to be priced much higher. The car companies are losing billions as a result. We could have a market crash due to the deflating of an AI bubble. Unregulated crypto could also cause a crash. Who knows?

On the political front, we have the possibility of armed intervention in our cities, and even in the election. That kind of uncertainty is bad for business, and for my profits. I’m pulling back, watching, and waiting. Most everyone I know is doing the same thing.

S: Of course you are, you RINO.

C: Sebastian, why are you optimistic, and why is that optimism tempered by caution?

S: I’m optimistic because Donald Trump is president, and I believe in him. The worst of the tariff impacts are over–now we get the benefits. There hasn’t been any explosion in inflation. Most of all, I know Trump is going to continue kicking the people I hate. For me, that’s what success is all about. It’s not about money so much as showing the elites who’s in charge.

The caution comes when I see the polls and think about past midterms. The Republicans could lose without Trump on the ballot. Then what? Two years of constitutional crises. We don’t really need that.

M: At least we agree on that much.

C: Let’s make some specific predictions for the new year. Is there a new war with Iran?

S: No. Trump didn’t really want to do that. Iran is over for now.

M: Agreed.

C: Do we invade Venezuela?

S: We don’t have to. Maduro leaves. The democratically elected group takes power and gives Trump an interest in their oil in an expression of gratitude. The Venezuelan refugees go home. It’s yet another great Trump victory.

M: That’s way too optimistic. Maduro stays. Trump has to decide whether to violate his principles and offend some of the base by invading or to look like an impotent fool. Fortunately, he has an underappreciated gift for spinning his defeats into victories. He backs down.

C: Does the Ukraine war end?

S: Trump makes it crystal clear that America will no longer help Ukraine fight this hopeless war. The Russians start to advance more rapidly, and the Euros can’t help. Ukraine ultimately makes a deal along the lines that Trump has proposed, because, at last, the government understands that the Russians have all of the cards.

M: Both the Russians on the one hand and the Euros and Ukrainians on the other do their best to play Trump to keep him from supporting the other side. Trump can’t stick to any position for more than a few weeks or so. In the meantime, the war goes on with little change.

C: See you next year.

Given America’s, shall we say, complicated history with the Middle East. the NSS is surprisingly bullish on the region. As the story goes, since Trump and Bibi have crushed the terrorists, and America is the predominant world supplier of energy, we can turn our attention away from security and oil to commercial objectives. There is plenty of money to be made with the Arabs. A golden age, in every possible sense, is about to begin.

But plenty of American presidents have attempted unsuccessfully to disengage with the Middle East. The sources of instability are still out there. The Palestinians still have a vote on their future. The golden age will probably turn to mud.

The most interesting thing about this section of the NSS is the apparent absence of an America First exception for Israel. Given that Trump only believes in interests, not shared values, this makes perfect sense. It also helps him with the Nick Fuentes elements of his own party. If you are Bibi, however, you should be very worried.

To no one’s surprise, the Court appears to be leaning towards accommodating Trump in the Slaughter case. The following observations are pertinent:

1. The issue should not be partisan; President Newsom would have the same rights as Trump. Nevertheless, the vote will likely fall on partisan grounds.
2. The Court will be overturning a precedent that is 90 years old.
3. In addition, it will be invalidating clear language in a wide range of statutes. SCOTUS is only supposed to do that as an absolute last resort.
4. It will also reject a distinction in a previous Roberts opinion between agencies with a single head and no legislative or judicial power and other independent agencies. In separation of power terms, that made some sense. Roberts will have to either lie about the facts in the instant case or repudiate his own arguments.
5. The basis for the decision will not really be either textual or originalist. Independent agencies of the type created in the early 20th century didn’t exist at the time the Constitution was written.
6. The basis will actually be the views of six justices on a political question relating to the proper implementation of the separation of powers. In that sense, the decision will be reminiscent of the immunity case, which was not based on facts, text, legislative history, or case law, but on the manner in which the majority felt the Constitution should have been written.
7. The most interesting section of the majority opinion will be the part in which the justices try to distinguish the Fed from all other independent agencies without sounding cynical or ridiculous. Will they succeed? TBD.

Power has been leaking out of Congress into the executive branch all year. SCOTUS is expected to ratify part of that process by eliminating independent agencies, with the possible exception of the Fed; the oral argument on the case that will overturn the pertinent 90-year-old precedent is today. What happens then? What can Congress do to save itself?

SCOTUS is effectively demanding that Congress legislate constantly and clearly to force the executive branch to do its bidding. In the current hyper-partisan environment, that means eliminating the filibuster, with all of the risks that entails. There simply is no other solution.

There is plenty for Xi Jinping to like in the NSS. Trump explicitly disclaims any desire to hector authoritarian states on human rights; his interventions will only take place in Europe. He believes in power, not rules, and gives a green light to large nations to work their will. And he advocates for a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which practically invites China to do the same and invade Taiwan.

The NSS does support protecting Taiwan, to be sure, but based solely on American economic interests, not the security of our allies. The document demands that the Asian allies beef up their defense spending while offering nothing but tariffs in return. Any notion of solidarity on the basis of liberal democratic values is, of course, completely off the table.

Trump makes it completely clear that he views China primarily as an economic threat to the United States, not an ideological or military adversary. His principal objective is to reduce the Chinese trade surplus. That could be done by signing agreements with our Asian allies that bind them more closely to America, but Trump has done precisely the opposite with his trade policies. As a result, regardless of the suggestions that the objective is to enhance the Biden approach of flexible containment, it is hard to read the NSS, in the real world, as anything but the beginning of a spheres of influence doctrine.

As a statement of Trump’s world view, it is hard to beat the new NSS. I will be reacting to its statements pertaining to particular parts of the world over the next week, but here are some overall opinions:

1. This is probably the first time an NSS has sucked up to the man who authorized it.
2. The NSS makes it clear that supporting liberal democracy throughout the world is no longer a national interest.
3. In a similar vein, the NSS rejects any kind of rules-based international system. Geopolitics, according to the document, is purely about power.
4. As a result, the NSS does nothing to condemn Russia for invading Ukraine. That is what large countries do to lesser fry.
5. The authors of the document make brief statements about exercising American soft power, but they do not appear to have any idea of what it is. Boasting about how great you are is not soft power.
6. Ending mass migration all over the world is a ridiculous objective.
7. The document links foreign policy to the domestic elimination of DEI in a way that has never been seen before and makes little sense.

Trump claims that his plan to massively deregulate business will result in lower costs for the consumer. Is that true?

Unless a particular regulation is either completely redundant or arbitrary, weakening or eliminating it does not reduce costs–it just shifts them. Getting rid of labor regulations, for example, cuts costs for business owners, and possibly (not certainly) results in price reductions for consumers, but it imposes new health-related costs on workers. Eliminating air quality standards cuts business costs but damages public health and the quality of life. Permitting truckers to drive more hours improves the bottom line but puts the lives of other drivers at risk. And so on.

The process of creating and enforcing new regulations consequently has always focused on identifying and weighing all of their costs and benefits. Trump apparently believes that cutting business costs is a value that outweighs any other considerations.

The use of criminal law for retribution is off to a rocky start. Trial judges are refusing to apply the presumption of regularity on critical procedural issues, grand juries are declining to indict, and trial juries are acquitting Trump’s targets. What should we make of this?

Part of the DOJ’s failures are due to incompetence and Trump’s blatant attempts to interfere in the process, of course. But part of it is the willingness of locals–including, in some cases, federal judges appointed by Trump himself–to look at what is actually happening rather than assuming the government is acting in good faith.

Even a lapdog Supreme Court will be of limited help to Trump here. The James II analogy looks more pertinent with each passing day.

Pete Hegseth has precisely zero qualifications to run the DOD. He has embarrassed Trump with his antics on multiple occasions. But Trump shows no inclination to fire him. Why?

Because Hegseth’s real job, in Trump’s eyes, is to turn the American military into a right-wing militia for use against Trump’s personal adversaries, domestic as well as foreign. Whatever his other failures, Hegseth appears to be completely committed to that task. To Trump, everything else is just noise.

The MSM like to speculate about Trump’s plans to run for a third term. Trump encourages the chatter because it strengthens his hold on the GOP. Should we take it seriously?

Given Trump’s persistent unpopularity and the clear language in the Constitution, there is no way he could possibly win a third term in a free and fair election. At some level, he has to know that. Any attempt for a third term, therefore, would have to be accompanied by successful efforts to use the judiciary and the military to rig the election. In other words, there will be no “race” for a third term; there can only be a ratification of a coup d’etat.

It would be a serious mistake to completely dismiss the coup scenario, but the more likely outcome in light of Trump’s age is J.D. promising to govern as a ventriloquist’s dummy. That option would more or less unite the GOP, avoid the constitutional question, and spare Trump the possibility of a very personal defeat, which is an intolerable existential threat to his fragile psyche.

J.D. Vance and Ron DeSantis have a lot in common. Both are conservative Catholics; both served in the military; both have law degrees from Ivy League schools; both hate intellectual elites and wokeness with a passion; neither has what you would call a winning personality, although DeSantis is worse; and both are desperate to be elected president. That means the almost certain conflict between the two in the 2028 GOP primaries will be fascinating.

DeSantis starts with one substantial advantage; he is not bound by the entirety of the Trump legacy, so he can pick and choose which parts he agrees with, depending on the mood of the country. This could be particularly helpful with inflation and free trade. But Vance holds two aces; he will have more initial support from the base, and Trump will keep open his option to run for a third term as long as possible, thereby making it difficult for an outsider to put together a campaign until the last minute. Would DeSantis have the nerve to challenge Trump a second time after offending the base in 2023 and 2024? I doubt it.

Vance, therefore, will begin the campaign with the edge. Whether he can keep it will depend on his performance and the perceived state of the economy. If the country has turned against Trump, most notably on tariffs, DeSantis will have a fighting chance.

CBP IS COMING TO TOWN

You better watch out.

You better go hide.

We whistle and shout.

I’m telling you why.

CBP is coming to town.

____________

They’ve got a long list.

They’re checking it twice.

If it isn’t them

Then it’s bound to be ICE.

CBP is coming to town.

_________

They track you while you’re sleeping.

They’ve got you in their sights.

So stay away from Home Depot

Unless you work at night.

_______________

You better watch out.

You better go hide.

We whistle and shout

I’m telling you why.

CBP is coming to town.

A Thomas Edsall column typically is a long list of emails from experts with little or no meaningful analysis from the author, which is why they are rarely worthy of much attention. Yesterday’s column, however, contained an interesting discussion regarding Vance’s relationships with New Right intellectual leaders; I recommend reading it, if possible.

The column makes the point that Vance is highly connected with the entire gamut of New Right thinkers, from Adrian Vermeule to Bronze Age Pervert. The real question is whether that will help him in 2028, because the base doesn’t even know who these people are, much less follow them on Sewer. I think the clear answer to the question is no; in fact, the anti-democratic views of some of these guys will be an embarrassment during the primaries, to say nothing of the general election.

The GOP managed to hang on to a House seat in a ruby red district in Tennessee yesterday, but the swing against them was 13 points. A column in today’s NYT tells us that this swing is completely normal, both in this election cycle and in previous midterms. In spite of all of the handwringing about the state of the Democrats after last year, barring an unforeseen improvement in the economy or a descent into pure fascism, this means the blue team should do very well in 2026.

The end of the Trump era is on the horizon. Almost exactly a year ago, I speculated that SCOTUS would show more independence if the administration was polling badly. Will the prospect of a Democrat in the White House in 2028 cause Roberts and his allies to think twice about enhancing executive power in the short run?

I suspect it will, particularly on issues (think tariffs) on which the GOP is already badly divided.

The preliminary information suggests that holiday spending has been unexpectedly robust in spite of the struggling real economy. It has been fueled, not by right-wing blue-collar workers, but by relatively affluent people, primarily from blue states, with hefty investments in the soaring stock market.

In other words, the dollar store economy has come roaring back, which is exactly what Trump supposedly is trying to avoid. The political survival of Republicans consequently depends on the continued spending of the information economy elites that Trump purports to despise.

That’s a paradox. It’s also a lesson, if you take it the right way.